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I. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. Internet policy has reached a crossroads. After years of de-
lay, the Supreme Court’s recent Brand X decision has cleared the way 
for the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to resolve how 
to fit the leading broadband technologies, such as cable modems and 
digital subscriber line (“DSL”) services, into the existing regulatory 
regime.1 Having largely failed to take the Internet into consideration 
when enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996,2 Congress is 
preparing to reenter the fray as it begins work on its second major 
overhaul of the communications laws in less than a decade.3 The de-
mands that end users are placing on the Internet are changing just as 
rapidly, as evidenced by the increasing popularity of bandwidth-
intensive applications, such as streaming media and Internet telephony 
(also known as “voice over Internet protocol” or “VoIP”). In the 
meantime, a host of new communications platforms are waiting in the 
 
1. Despite the growing importance of the Internet throughout the late 1990s, the FCC 
avoided addressing the proper regulatory classification of broadband services until 2002. 
See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [herein-
after Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM]; Appropriate Framework for Broad-
band Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 
F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband NPRM]. The Ninth Circuit soon 
brought these proceedings to an abrupt halt by holding that the FCC’s determination that 
cable modem systems constitute “information services” was barred by stare decisis. See 
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court eventu-
ally overturned the Ninth Circuit and upheld the FCC’s authority to resolve these issues. See 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).  
2. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 37, 42 (2002) (“The 1996 Act simply did not contemplate the radical 
changes the Internet would bring to the communications world.”). 
3. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, What U.S. Businesses Are Looking for During Bush’s 2nd 
Term: New Telecom Rules, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 2004, at 19. 
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wings, such as third-generation mobile communications devices 
(“3G”) and wireless hotspots employing WiFi technology. 
As of today, most Internet users communicate through a suite of 
nonproprietary protocols known as the transmission control proto-
col/Internet protocol (“TCP/IP”). Widespread adoption of TCP/IP has 
given the Internet a nearly universal interoperability that allows all 
end users to access Internet applications and content on a nondis-
criminatory basis. Commentators, led by Lawrence Lessig,4 have long 
been concerned that cable modem and DSL systems will use their 
control of the “last mile” of the network to block or slow access to 
content and applications that threaten their proprietary operations. The 
concern is that the resulting reduction in interoperability would impair 
the environment for competition and innovation in the market for 
Internet content and applications. 
Elsewhere, I address proposals that attempt to preserve the trans-
parency of the Internet by regulating last-mile providers’ relationships 
with end users.5 This Article focuses instead on proposals to regulate 
last-mile providers’ relationships with network and content providers. 
Some call for mandating interconnection of broadband networks 
along standardized interfaces such as TCP/IP.6 Others argue in favor 
of a presumption that any discriminatory access agreements are anti-
competitive, leaving the precise regulatory requirements to be devel-
oped over time through case-by-case adjudications.7 Although these 
proposals vary considerably in both their terminology and details, 
they can comfortably be aggregated within the broad rubric of “net-
work neutrality.” 
 
4. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 46–48, 155–76, 246–49 (2001). 
5. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
6. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46–48, 155–76, 246–49; Mark Cooper, Open Com-
munications Platforms: The Physical Infrastructure as the Bedrock of Innovation and De-
mocratic Discourse in the Internet Age, 2 J. on TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 177 (2003); 
Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 
1041, 1062–65 (1996); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet 
Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 851, 878 (2004); Werbach, supra 
note 2, at 65–67; Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004); cf. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet 
Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 268–79 (2002) (proposing mandatory intercon-
nection among Internet carriers). These proposals are related to early calls for forcing cable 
modem systems to provide access to all Internet service providers. See Mark A. Lemley & 
Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the 
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001). It is also similar to the complaint that net-
work owners are creating “walled gardens” that favor proprietary content. See, e.g., LESSIG, 
supra note 4, at 156; Hernan Galperin & Francois Bar, The Regulation of Interactive Televi-
sion in the United States and the European Union, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 61, 62–64, 69–72 
(2002). 
7. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 41, 74–76 (2003); cf. Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2005) (offering a weaker version of network neutrality that 
places a “thumb on the scale” in favor of full interoperability). 
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The various sides of the debate differ over whether last-mile pro-
viders are blocking access to content and applications. Leading cable 
modem and DSL providers have asserted that they have not blocked 
access to any content or applications and that competitive forces 
would preclude any future attempt to do so.8 Indeed, the FCC and 
leading congressional proponents of network neutrality have repeat-
edly noted the lack of evidence of any such activity.9 However, the 
potential danger stemming from last-mile providers’ ability to block 
access to certain applications was underscored when a small tele-
communications carrier known as Madison River Communications 
prevented its DSL customers from accessing the ports needed for 
VoIP service.10 Allegations of similar interruptions of VoIP service by 
minor service providers soon followed.11  
The regulatory measures taken by the FCC following Brand X 
have further heightened these concerns. The FCC followed its initial 
decision that cable modem systems represent “information services”12 
with a decision declaring that DSL is also an information service that 
is exempt from the access requirements imposed on telecommunica-
tions carriers by Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 as 
amended.13 At the same time, the FCC repealed the access and inter-
operability requirements established during the Computer Inquiries 
and rejected calls for imposing alternative access requirements or 
nondiscrimination requirements on the ground that competition ren-
 
8. See National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Cable Provides Open Con-
nectivity for the Internet 1 (June 2004) (noting that cable modem providers do not restrict 
end users’ ability to access content), available at http://www.ncta.com/pdf_files/IssueBriefs/ 
OpenInternet.pdf; Amy Schatz & Anne Marie Squeo, As Web Providers’ Clout Grows, 
Fears Over Access Take Focus: FCC’s Ruling Fuels Debate Between Broadband Firms and 
Producers of Content, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at A1 (noting telephone and cable com-
panies’ insistence that competition will ensure that they will not block access to Internet 
content). 
9. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 1, at 4845 ¶ 87 (noting 
that the FCC was unaware of any allegation that a cable operator had denied or slowed 
access to any content or network provider); Peter J. Howe, News from the Chicago Cable 
and Telecom Show, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 2003, at C2 (quoting FCC Commissioner 
Jonathan Adelstein as saying “[w]e don’t see overwhelming evidence of a problem right 
now” and calling network neutrality “a solution awaiting a problem”); Schatz & Squeo, 
supra note 8 (quoting FCC Chairman Kevin Martin as saying “[w]e haven’t seen any evi-
dence of this being a problem” and noting that “[C]ongressional proponents of net-neutrality 
legislation acknowledge that it isn’t a problem now”); cf. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 6, at 
955 (conceding that the risks of nonneutrality had not yet come to pass). 
10. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). 
11. See Tripp Blatz, Three Carriers Have Now Blocked Access to Ports for VoIP, Vonage 
Chairman Alleges, TELECOMM. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2005. 
12. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 1, at 4820–39 ¶¶ 34–
71. 
13. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Fa-
cilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,862–
65, ¶¶ 12–17 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order]. 
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dered any such regulation unnecessary.14 The FCC’s rationale appears 
to foreclose the possibility left open in an earlier proceeding of impos-
ing similar access regulations on cable modem systems.15
At the same time, the FCC explicitly reserved the right to revisit 
this decision should circumstances warrant doing so16 and issued a 
policy statement recognizing the agency’s intent to preserve consum-
ers’ rights to access content and run applications as they see fit.17 The 
policy statement recognized an exception for “reasonable network 
management” and conceded that it lacked legal effect until incorpo-
rated into formal rules.18 In addition, a statement released by FCC 
Chairman Kevin Martin in conjunction with the policy statement ex-
pressed his confidence that competition would remain sufficiently 
robust that such regulation would prove unnecessary.19 The debate 
spilled over onto the front page of the Wall Street Journal, which pre-
dicted that network neutrality will be a major issue as Congress con-
siders overhauling the communications laws.20
There can be no question that interoperability provides substantial 
economic benefits. Making Internet applications and content univer-
sally accessible increases the value of the network to both end users 
and providers of applications and content. Indeed, as the FCC has rec-
ognized, the benefits from network neutrality are often so compelling 
that the vast majority of network owners can be expected to adhere to 
it voluntarily.21 Furthermore, network neutrality hearkens back to the 
regime of mandatory interconnection and interface standardization 
used so successfully by the courts and the FCC to foster competition 
in telephone equipment (known as “customer premises equipment” or 
“CPE”),22 long distance,23 and “enhanced services” (services that use 
 
14. Id. at 14,865–98 ¶¶ 18–85, 14,904–05 ¶¶ 96–97; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2708 (2005) (noting that the FCC “re-
mains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancil-
lary jurisdiction”). 
15. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 1, at 4839–41 ¶¶ 72–
74, 4843–48 ¶¶ 83–95.  
16. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 13, at 14904 ¶ 96. 
17. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facili-
ties, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005).  
18. Id. at 14988 n.15.  
19. FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, Comments on Commission Policy Statement 1  
(Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
260435A2.pdf. 
20. See Schatz & Squeo, supra note 8. 
21. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 13, at 14,892–94 ¶¶ 74–76, at 14,901–02 ¶ 91, 
14,904–05 ¶¶ 96–97; see also James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A 
Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 83–84 
(2000).  
22. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 662–79 (2d ed. 
1999). The FCC’s landmark Carterfone decision overturned AT&T’s “foreign attachments” 
policy, which prohibited customers from interconnecting any CPE not manufactured by 
AT&T’s equipment subsidiary, Western Electric. Carterfone instead ruled that customers 
have the right to attach any device to the telephone system “so long as the interconnection 
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modems to enable telephone networks to convey computer-related 
traffic in addition to voice communications).24 Concepts like openness 
and neutrality also seem to promote such widely held values as equal-
ity of treatment and freedom of choice. The recent surge of merger 
activity in the cable and telecommunications industries appears to 
make concerns about gatekeeper control by network owners all the 
more plausible.  
That said, when deciding whether to impose network neutrality as 
a regulatory mandate, the key question is not whether network neu-
trality provides substantial benefits. Instead, the key inquiry is 
whether circumstances exist in which deviations from network neu-
trality would create benefits that would be foreclosed if network neu-
trality were imposed. As the Supreme Court recognized in assessing 
the parallel question under the antitrust laws, a business practice 
 
does not adversely affect the telephone company’s operations or the telephone system’s 
utility for others.” Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Services, Deci-
sion, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968). The FCC eventually standardized the interface and re-
quired AT&T to allow the attachment of any CPE that complied with certain designated 
standards. See Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll 
Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report and 
Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975) (codified as amended at 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.1–.614), aff’d sub 
nom. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977). Similar CPE interconnec-
tion and standardization requirements were later imposed on the newly divested Bell Oper-
ating Companies (“BOCs”) by the court overseeing the breakup of AT&T. See HUBER ET 
AL., supra, at 418–19. 
23. After the advent of microwave transmission made long distance competition feasible, 
the FCC (at the goading of the D.C. Circuit) eventually required AT&T to interconnect with 
all long distance carriers. The breakup of AT&T, in which the court required the BOCs to 
interconnect with all long distance carriers, further reinforced the obligation to interconnect. 
The court also ordered the BOCs to redesign and reprogram their switches to incorporate a 
standardized interface by 1986. This so-called “equal access” mandate was later extended to 
non-Bell local telephone companies as well. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 22, at 751–90.  
24. The first and second Computer Inquiries required major local telephone companies 
that wished to provide enhanced services to do so through a separate subsidiary and to pro-
vide tariffs that permitted all providers of enhanced services to interconnect with their net-
works. The court presiding over the breakup of AT&T imposed similar requirements on the 
BOCs. The third Computer Inquiry allowed major local telephone companies to forego the 
separate subsidiary requirement so long as they complied with regulatory systems called 
“comparably efficient interconnection” (“CEI”) and “open network architecture” (“ONA”). 
CEI and ONA require local telephone companies to interconnect with unaffiliated enhanced 
service providers on nondiscriminatory terms. See id. at 1088–95, 1107–55. The FCC also 
required the BOCs to “make available standardized hardware and software interfaces that 
are able to support transmission, switching, and signaling functions identical to those util-
ized in the enhanced service provided by the carrier.” Computer III Further Remand Pro-
ceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 14 
F.C.C.R. 4289, 4298 ¶ 13 (1999) (citing Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commis-
sion’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 
958, 1039 ¶ 157 (1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. California v. 
FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted). The regime created by 
the third Computer Inquiry was eventually overturned on judicial review. See California v. 
FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 925–30 (9th Cir. 1994); California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1230–39 (9th 
Cir. 1990). The remand proceedings were eventually rolled into the broadband proceedings 
opened in 2002. See Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 1, at 3024 ¶ 8. 
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should not be declared illegal per se unless the challenged practice 
evinces such a “pernicious effect on competition” and such a “lack of 
any redeeming virtue” that nothing would be lost if it were “presumed 
to be . . . illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [it] 
ha[s] caused or the business excuse for [its] use.”25 In the absence of a 
clear competitive harm, the standard response under competition pol-
icy is to forbear from categorically prohibiting the challenged practice 
and instead to evaluate its effect on competition on a case-by-case 
basis.26  
This approach allows policymakers to steer a middle course when 
facing uncertainty about the competitive impact of conflicting busi-
ness models. Rather than presumptively favoring one particular archi-
tecture and placing the burden of proof on parties wishing to deviate 
from it, adopting a more restrained regulatory posture permits poli-
cymakers to avoid committing to either side of the debate and instead 
permit both approaches to go forward until the economic implications 
become clearer. The approach I am proposing would have its biggest 
impact with respect to practices that could possibly promote or harm 
competition and for which it is difficult to anticipate how competition 
will be affected. Presumptions in favor of a particular architecture 
effectively foreclose the potential benefits of alternative approaches 
even when there is no clear indication that permitting such a deviation 
would cause any demonstrable harm. A more restrained approach 
would give the benefit of the doubt to ambiguous cases and permit 
them to go forward unless and until there was a concrete showing of 
anticompetitive harm. Any other rule would short-circuit the process 
of experimentation with new products and alternate organizational 
forms that is essential to a properly functioning market. Such toler-
ance is particularly appropriate in light of network neutrality propo-
nents’ acknowledgement that standardization can lead to market 
failure, that deviating from universal interoperability and interconnec-
tivity can yield substantial benefits, and that determining whether a 
particular practice will help or harm competition is often difficult, if 
not impossible.27 In addition, a less categorical and more restrained 
approach is particularly appropriate when technological change is 
transforming the economic impact of various practices. A better un-
derstanding of the potential benefits of deviating from network neu-
 
25. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
26. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262–63 (1963). 
27. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46–48, 167–75; Mark Cooper, Open Access to the 
Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Net-
works, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1050–52 (2000); Lemley & Lessig, supra note 6, at 939; 
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141, 147–49 (2003). 
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trality is thus essential for any proper assessment of the relevant 
tradeoffs.28
In this Article, I would like to explore whether imposing network 
neutrality would forestall the realization of important economic bene-
fits. What emerges is a fascinating picture that is more complex than 
that suggested by the current literature. My analysis reveals that net-
work neutrality is based on assumptions about the uniformity of con-
sumer demand and the infeasibility of entry that, while having some 
validity during the early days of the Internet, no longer hold true. In 
addition, it suggests that the term “network neutrality” is something of 
a misnomer. Adoption of any standardized interface has the inevitable 
effect of favoring certain applications and disfavoring others. For ex-
ample, TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a “first come, first 
served” and “best efforts” basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applica-
tions that are less tolerant of variations in throughput rates, such as 
streaming media and VoIP, and is biased against network-based secu-
rity features that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and spam. 
Contrary to what the nomenclature might suggest, network neutrality 
is anything but neutral. Indeed, using regulation to standardize inter-
faces has the unfortunate effect of forcing the government to act as the 
central planner of the technological evolution of the network. 
Economic theory suggests that network neutrality proponents are 
focusing on the wrong policy problem. One of the basic tenets of ver-
tical integration theory is that any chain of production will only be as 
efficient as its least competitive link. As a result, competition policy 
should focus on identifying the link that is the most concentrated and 
the most protected by entry barriers and design regulations to increase 
its competitiveness. In the broadband industry, the level of production 
that is the most concentrated and protected by barriers to entry is the 
last mile. This implies that decisions about Internet regulation should 
be guided by their impact on competition in that portion of the indus-
try. Rather than adopt this orientation, network neutrality advocates 
direct their attention to preserving and promoting competition among 
providers of content and applications, which is the level of production 
that is already the most competitive and the most likely to remain that 
way.  
 
28. The existing critiques of network neutrality are important but do not provide extended 
evaluation of the underlying economics. See Bruce M. Owen & Gregory L. Rosston, Local 
Broadband Access: Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi? A Property Rights Approach, 
11–12 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication No. 03-19, 
Aug. 2003), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php? 
id=285; John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: 
Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891 (2001); Adam Thierer, 
Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, “Net Neutrality,” 
and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005). 
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Once one makes improving the competitiveness of the last mile 
the central goal of broadband policy, network neutrality becomes po-
tentially more problematic and counterproductive. For example, net-
work neutrality can exacerbate the impact of up-front, fixed costs and 
network economic effects, which are the most commonly identified 
sources of market failure that justify the regulation of telecommunica-
tions markets. Specifically, the existing debate has largely overlooked 
how product differentiation can ameliorate both of these effects and 
allow smaller producers to survive despite having lower sales volumes 
and higher per-unit costs. Such solutions are quite common in other 
industries. For example, it is the same mechanism that allows spe-
cialty stores to survive despite competition from low-cost, mass-
market discounters. Differentiation allows them to retain those cus-
tomers who place a higher value on a particular type of product de-
spite the fact that prices may be somewhat higher. 
A similar solution is possible in the broadband industry. Allowing 
network owners to differentiate their networks can better satisfy the 
increasing heterogeneity of end user demand. In addition, increasing 
the number of dimensions along which networks compete can miti-
gate supply-side and demand-side economies of scale. Restated in 
terms of the Internet, network diversity might make it possible for 
three different last-mile networks to coexist: one optimized for tradi-
tional Internet applications such as e-mail and website access; another 
incorporating security features to facilitate e-commerce and to guard 
against viruses, spam, and other undesirable aspects of life on the 
Internet; and a third that prioritizes packets in the manner needed to 
facilitate time-sensitive applications such as streaming media and 
VoIP. Each would survive by catering to the market segment that 
places the highest value on a particular type of service.  
Extended to its logical conclusion, this analysis suggests that pub-
lic policy would be better served if Congress and the FCC were to 
embrace a “network diversity” principle that permits network owners 
to deploy proprietary protocols and to enter into exclusivity agree-
ments with content providers. Preventing network owners from differ-
entiating their offerings would forestall this process. In other words, 
standardization of TCP/IP would have the effect of narrowing the di-
mensions of competition, forcing networks to compete solely on the 
basis of price and network size. The commodification of bandwidth 
would foreclose one avenue for mitigating the advantages enjoyed by 
the largest players. 
At the same time, network neutrality threatens to reduce incen-
tives to increase competition through the construction of new net-
works. Eliminating the potential for short-run supracompetitive 
returns would also thwart one of the primary mechanisms upon which 
markets rely to stimulate entry. Furthermore, by providing all applica-
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tions and content providers with access to the existing network, net-
work neutrality deprives would-be builders of alternative network 
capacity of their natural strategic partners. Concerns about reducing 
investment incentives carry little weight when last-mile competition is 
infeasible, as was arguably the case when interconnection and stan-
dardization were mandated with respect to CPE, long distance, and 
enhanced services. They are paramount when entry by new last-mile 
providers is ongoing and other last-mile technologies are waiting in 
the wings. Under these circumstances, regulation imposed to curb 
market concentration can turn into the cause, rather than the conse-
quence, of market failure.  
What emerges is a vision of competition that is quite different 
from that envisioned by the current debate. This is not to say that net-
work diversity would be a panacea. The analytical framework laid out 
in this Article underscores the complexity of the underlying welfare 
calculus. Just to highlight a couple of considerations, the aggregate 
demand and the cost structure may cause the level of competition to 
be insufficiently robust to yield the benefits I have identified. Fur-
thermore, the viability of network diversity depends in no small part 
on the relative heterogeneity of consumer preferences. If there is no 
variance in what end users want from networks, there will be no sub-
segments for smaller network owners to target. In addition, some de-
gree of deadweight loss and redundant entry may be endemic under 
network diversity, and it is possible that the welfare increases associ-
ated with greater product diversity will not completely offset these 
losses. Furthermore, given that entry is never instantaneous, welfare 
analysis of network diversity requires balancing the short-run static 
efficiency losses from allowing network owners to earn short-run su-
pracompetitive profits against the long-run dynamic efficiency gains 
resulting from stimulating the entry of competing networks. In short, 
determining whether network neutrality or network diversity would 
lead to a more socially beneficial outcome is a context-specific in-
quiry that cannot be determined a priori. The absence of simple policy 
inferences renders the regulatory decision about whether to impose 
network neutrality quite complex. Indeed, network neutrality propo-
nents have suggested that many of the problems I have identified can 
be addressed through other means.29
There are, however, a number of institutional considerations that 
suggest that network diversity might well be the better approach. To 
the extent that regulatory solutions take the form of ex ante rules, they 
are poorly suited to the context-specific determinations suggested by 
network diversity theory. Even a presumption that discriminatory ac-
cess arrangements are anticompetitive would prevent network owners 
 
29. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46–48, 167–75; Wu, supra note 6, at 147–49. 
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from experimenting with network diversity, since they would pre-
sumably be foreclosed from adopting any practice that deviated from 
interoperability and interconnectivity unless they can demonstrate 
clear benefits. Network neutrality proponents concede the difficulties 
in distinguishing practices that are economically justified from those 
that will harm competition.30 Because of the inherent ambiguity of 
many business practices, competition policy’s usual response is not to 
put the burden of demonstrating economic benefits on parties who 
wish to adopt a practice, but rather to place the burden on the oppo-
nents of the practice and to permit the practice to occur until oppo-
nents can demonstrate anticompetitive harm.  
In addition, the regulatory tools needed to implement the regime 
of interconnection, standardization, rate regulation, and nondiscrimi-
nation implicit in network neutrality have long been criticized as dif-
ficult to implement and unlikely to be effective in industries like 
broadband, where the services provided vary in quality and where 
technology is changing rapidly. Regulatory lag creates the danger that 
restrictions will persist long after the conditions that justified their 
imposition have dissipated. Even worse, by reducing investment in-
centives, network neutrality can itself become the means through 
which market concentration is cemented into place. Indeed, one of the 
principal drawbacks about regimes of mandatory interconnection and 
interface standardization is that they implicitly presuppose that regula-
tion will continue indefinitely. Network diversity, in contrast, is better 
at facilitating competitive entry. As such, it has the advantage of hav-
ing embedded within it a built-in exit strategy. 
Even these arguments, while carrying considerable persuasive 
force, fall short of providing a definitive resolution of these issues, 
and the debate all too often risks collapsing into battles over ideology. 
Competition policy offers a potential solution by implicitly recogniz-
ing that the best response in the face of uncertainty is forbearance. 
Until it is clear whether adhering to or deviating from complete inter-
operability would be the better course of action, competition policy 
would counsel in favor of permitting both architectures to go forward. 
Intervening by mandating network neutrality would have the inevita-
ble effect of locking the existing interfaces into place and of foreclos-
ing experimentation into new products and alternative organizational 
forms that transcend traditional firm boundaries.  
The decision to permit network diversity to emerge, then, does 
not necessarily depend on a conviction that it would yield a substan-
tively better outcome, but rather from a “technological humility” that 
permits exploration to proceed until policymakers can make a clearer 
assessment of the cost-benefit tradeoff. Although preserving the status 
 
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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quo might be preferable if allowing such experimentation would in-
flict irreversible and catastrophic harm, neither would seem to be the 
case with respect to network neutrality. In this sense, network diver-
sity is not the mirror image of network neutrality, in that it does not 
call for the imposition of any mandatory obligations. Rather, network 
diversity adopts the more modest position that regards regulatory for-
bearance as the appropriate course of action when confronted with 
ambiguity.  
The balance of my argument is organized as follows. In Part II, I 
demonstrate how network neutrality proponents are focusing on the 
wrong policy problem by supporting regulation to preserve competi-
tion in applications and content, which are the portions of the industry 
that are already the most competitive and the most likely to remain 
that way. Instead, regulation should be directed toward fostering com-
petition in the last mile, which is the industry segment that is the most 
concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers.  
In Part III, I analyze the potential drawbacks to network neutral-
ity, explaining how network neutrality narrows consumer choice, dis-
favors certain applications, reinforces sources of market failure in the 
last mile, and dampens investment in alternative network capacity, 
which in turn threatens to entrench the existing oligopoly into place. I 
draw on the economic literature on product differentiation and net-
work economic effects to lay out the case in favor of network diver-
sity. In the process, I engage arguments about the “end-to-end” 
principle, which has played a prominent role in the existing debate. I 
also show how network neutrality necessarily relies upon regulatory 
tools that have become suspect in a world in which communications 
have become increasingly decommodified. I also briefly discuss the 
deficiencies of attempts to offer noneconomic justifications for net-
work neutrality.  
In Part IV, I consider the policy implications that emerge from the 
debate between network neutrality and network diversity. I begin by 
clarifying a common misunderstanding about the relationship between 
network diversity and the innovation-based theory of competition ar-
ticulated by Joseph Schumpeter.31 I then detail the complexity of the 
welfare analysis indicated by network diversity, showing that the eco-
nomic resolution of this debate turns on a number of context-specific 
determinations that cannot be determined a priori. I also outline a 
number of institutional considerations tending to militate against net-
work neutrality, including a brief discussion that considers whether 
these issues should be resolved under antitrust law. Part V closes by 
directly engaging the arguments offered by network neutrality propo-
 
31. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (3d 
ed. 1950). 
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nents and by offering a tentative resolution of these countervailing 
considerations. 
II. NETWORK NEUTRALITY’S MISPLACED FOCUS ON 
APPLICATIONS AND CONTENT 
Network neutrality’s central concern is that owners of cable mo-
dem and DSL systems will use their control over the last mile to harm 
application and content providers. This Part demonstrates how net-
work neutrality is fundamentally a concern about vertical integration. 
Section A maps network neutrality onto the two leading approaches 
for modeling the vertical structure of the broadband industry. Section 
B draws on the insights of vertical integration theory to show that 
network neutrality proponents are focusing on the wrong policy prob-
lem. Broadband policy would be better served if regulation was tar-
geted not at preserving and promoting competition in applications and 
content, but rather at increasing competition in the last mile. 
A. The Relationship Between Network Neutrality and Vertical 
Integration 
Regulations that compel access to bottleneck facilities are inher-
ently about vertical integration.32 That this is the case can be easily 
seen if the broadband industry is mapped onto the vertical chain of 
production that characterizes most industries.33 The initial stage is 
known as manufacturing and consists of the companies that create the 
products and services that end users actually consume. The final stage 
is known as retailing and is comprised of the companies responsible 
for delivering those products and services to end users. Although it is 
theoretically possible for retailers to purchase products directly from 
manufacturers, in some cases logistical complications create the need 
for an intermediate stage between manufacturers and retailers. Firms 
operating in this intermediate stage, known as wholesalers, assemble 
goods purchased directly from manufacturers into complete product 
lines and distribute them to retailers. Formal vertical integration 
through mergers, and de facto vertical integration through exclusivity 
arrangements between manufacturers and retailers or between manu-
facturers and wholesalers, are a common economic feature, appearing 
in industries varying from shoes to cars.34
 
32. See 3A PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 771, at 169–
71 (2d ed. 2002); LESSIG, supra note 4, at 165–66; Wu, supra note 6, at 84–85.  
33. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Econ-
omy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 182, 250–51 (2002). 
34. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
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The broadband industry fits easily into this vertical structure. The 
manufacturing stage is composed of the companies that produce web-
page content and Internet-based services, such as e-commerce and 
VoIP. The retail stage includes DSL providers, cable modem systems, 
and other last-mile technologies. Conceptualizing the chain of distri-
bution in this manner makes clear that the practices toward which 
network neutrality directs its attention, which are uniformly about 
last-mile providers favoring proprietary applications and content, are 
essentially forms of vertical integration. 
The emphasis on vertical integration remains clear even if net-
work neutrality is viewed through the “layered model” that has be-
come an increasingly popular way to conceive of the structure of the 
Internet. The leading approach disaggregates networks into four hori-
zontal layers that cut across different network providers.35 The bot-
tommost layer is the physical layer, which consists of the hardware 
infrastructure used to route and transmit the data packets that make up 
a particular form of communications. The second layer is the logical 
layer, which is composed of the protocols used to route packets to 
their proper destination and to ensure that they arrive intact. The third 
layer is the applications layer, which is comprised of the particular 
programs and functions used by consumers. The fourth layer is the 
content layer, which consists of the particular data being conveyed. 
The differences between the layers can be illustrated in terms of 
the most common Internet application: e-mail. The physical layer 
consists of the telephone or cable lines, e-mail servers, routers, and 
backbone facilities needed to convey the e-mail from one location to 
another. The logical layer consists of the SMTP protocol employed by 
the network to route the e-mail to its destination. The application layer 
consists of the e-mail program used, such as Microsoft Outlook. The 
content layer consists of the particular e-mail message sent. 
 
35. See Werbach, supra note 2, at 59–64; Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: 
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Lay-
ers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 624 (2004). The layered model is related to the Open 
Systems Interconnection (“OSI”) model developed by the International Standards Organiza-
tion (“ISO”) in the 1980s, which divides seven different layers. Because some of these 
distinctions have greater relevance for technologists than for policy analysts, the four-layer 
model combines some of these layers. See Werbach, supra note 2, at 59. Note that other 
versions of the layered approach use different numbers of layers. See LESSIG, supra note 4, 
at 23–25 (employing a three-layer model of physical, code, and content layers); Yochai 
Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Towards 
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000) (employing 
the same approach); Solum & Chung, supra note 6, at 816 (proposing a six-layer model); 
Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunicates Law for the Digital Age, 4 
J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2005) (revising his initial four-layer 
model into a three-layer model); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 
VA. L. REV. 1163, 1189–92 (1999) (proposing a different, four-layer model); infra note 166 
and accompanying text. 
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The layered model underscores the extent to which network neu-
trality is focused on vertical integration. The concern is that owners of 
the physical layer will use their control over the logical layer to give 
preferential treatment to proprietary applications and content. Net-
work neutrality thus proposes regulating the logical layer to preserve 
competition in the applications and content layers.  
B. The Insights of Vertical Integration Theory 
One of the key insights of vertical integration theory is that any 
vertical chain of production will only be efficient if every link is com-
petitive.36 The intuitions underlying that literature can be easily illus-
trated through a hypothetical example based on the Supreme Court’s 
landmark Terminal Railroad decision, the seminal case for mandating 
interconnection to a bottleneck facility.37 Suppose that a railway com-
pany controlled the only bridge across the Mississippi River at St. 
Louis and that it was using its control of the bridge either to give pref-
erential treatment to its proprietary rolling stock or to forbid compet-
ing carriers from using the bridge altogether. One might be tempted to 
require the bridge owner to allow other railway networks to intercon-
nect to its bridge and to require it to provide access to the bridge to all 
comers on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. Indeed, that is 
precisely the type of solution sanctioned by the Supreme Court.38
Vertical integration theorists have pointed out that this type of 
compulsory sharing of a monopoly facility represents something of a 
competition policy anomaly.39 When confronted with a concentrated 
market, the conventional response is to deconcentrate the problematic 
market, either by breaking up the existing monopoly or by facilitating 
entry by a competitor. The elimination of horizontal concentration 
allows private ordering to dissipate the supracompetitive prices and 
reductions in output associated with monopoly. 
Compelling interconnection to the bottleneck resource deviates 
from the conventional approach by leaving the monopoly in place and 
simply requiring that it be shared. As a result, it fails by itself to re-
duce prices below or increase output above monopoly levels. For ex-
ample, suppose that the monopoly price for shipping goods between 
two points across the bridge is $100 and that the cost of providing the 
rolling stock for that shipment is $35.40 A bridge monopolist who had 
 
36. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or 
Hurt Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 23, 59–60 (2004). 
37. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
38. See id. at 411–12. 
39. See, e.g., 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶ 771b, at 171–73. 
40. The example is adapted from one offered by then-Chief Judge Breyer, who in turn 
adapted it from the leading antitrust treatise. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 
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vertically integrated into rolling stock would be expected to charge 
$100 for the combined services. Now consider what would occur if 
regulators forced the bridge owner to provide all railroad companies 
nondiscriminatory access to its bridge. Absent price controls, the 
bridge owner would simply charge $65 to use its bridge. Since the 
market for rolling stock is competitive, the railroad companies would 
set their prices equal to their costs and charge $35. In the end, cus-
tomers still pay $100.  
Thus, forcing a bridge monopolist to provide nondiscriminatory 
access to its bridge provides no consumer benefits, since vertical dis-
integration does nothing to displace the bridge monopoly that is the 
real source of market failure.41 In essence, the Supreme Court focused 
on the wrong policy problem. It makes little sense to protect the mar-
ket for rolling stock. That market was already quite competitive, and 
the barriers to entering that portion of the industry were quite low. 
Rather than attempting to foster competition among railways, it 
should have focused its efforts on increasing the competitiveness of 
the market for bridges. In other words, competition policy would be 
better promoted if attention were focused on the level of production 
that is the most concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers. 
The same economic reasoning holds true for broadband. Suppose 
that vertical integration in broadband were banned altogether and that 
every last-mile provider were forced to divest its ownership interests 
in any content or applications provider. Would doing so reduce the 
market power of the last-mile providers? The answer is clearly “no.” 
The market power exercised by DSL and cable modem providers ex-
ists because of the limited number of options that end users have for 
obtaining last-mile services. The number of options will remain the 
same regardless of whether or not last-mile providers hold ownership 
stakes in content and application providers or whether unaffiliated 
content and application providers are granted nondiscriminatory ac-
cess. Vertical disintegration thus has no effect on last-mile providers’ 
ability to extract supracompetitive returns. Consumers will receive 
benefits only by promoting entry by alternative network capacity.  
This analysis emphasizes the extent to which network neutrality 
proponents are focusing on the wrong policy problem. By directing 
their efforts towards encouraging and preserving competition in the 
market for application and content, they are concentrating on the seg-
ments of the industry that are already the most competitive and the 
most likely to remain that way. This is not to say that the previous 
 
915 F.2d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.) (citing 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 728, at 199 (1978)).  
41. Indeed, if the market for rolling stock were also uncompetitive, double marginaliza-
tion theory indicates that vertical integration can actually enhance welfare. See Yoo, supra 
note 33, at 192–93, 260–61.  
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regulations designed to foster competition in CPE, long distance, and 
enhanced services were misguided. Focusing on promoting competi-
tion in complementary services may make sense when entry by alter-
native network capacity is impossible, as was arguably the case when 
the FCC mandated access to network transmission in order to promote 
competition in CPE,42 long distance,43 and enhanced services.44
The FCC has recognized, however, that the increasing availability 
of last-mile alternatives has undercut the continued appropriateness of 
this approach. For example, the FCC has ruled that the local telephone 
companies created by the breakup of AT&T now face sufficient com-
petition to justify permitting them to offer in-region long-distance 
service in every state except Alaska and Hawaii.45 In addition, in 
eliminating the regulatory requirements imposed by the Computer 
Inquiries, the FCC recognized that those rules “were developed before 
separate and different broadband technologies began to emerge and 
compete for customers” and could no longer be justified under con-
temporary circumstances.46 Lastly, the FCC has acknowledged that 
the increase in competition has weakened the ability of last-mile pro-
viders to discriminate in favor of proprietary CPE. The FCC has con-
cluded that the growth in competition among local exchange carriers 
justified abolishing its prohibition of bundling CPE with telecommu-
nications services.47 Even though local exchange markets were not yet 
perfectly competitive, the FCC concluded that the level of competi-
tion and the consumer benefits of bundling sufficiently mitigated the 
risk of anticompetitive harm.48 The FCC has subsequently abandoned 
its previous role in establishing the technical criteria for interconnect-
 
42. See, e.g., GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION 
AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 152 (1994) (explaining that mandatory intercon-
nection requirements are based on the assumption that customers’ premises are accessible 
only through the local telephone network). 
43. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475 (2002) (noting that at 
the time of the breakup of AT&T, local telephone service was thought to be a natural mo-
nopoly); WILLIAM BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL 
TELEPHONY 7–10 (1994) (noting the same);  
44. See, e.g., Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 1, at 3037 ¶ 36 (“[W]ith respect to 
technology, the core assumption underlying the Computer Inquiries was that the telephone 
network is the primary, if not exclusive, means through which information service providers 
can obtain access to customer.”); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2711 (2005) (quoting the above-quoted language from the Wireline 
Broadband NPRM with approval); Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra 
note 1, at 4825 ¶ 44 (quoting the same). 
45. See RBOC Applications to Prove In-Region, InterLATA Services Under § 271 (Feb. 
25, 2005), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/ (reporting 
that the FCC has ruled that local telephone companies are subject to sufficient competition 
to permit them to offer in-region long-distance service in every state except Alaska and 
Hawaii). 
46. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 13, at 14,876–77 ¶ 42. 
47. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report 
and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7424 ¶ 10 (2001). 
48. Id. at 7436–37 ¶¶ 30–31, 7438–40 ¶¶ 33–36. 
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ing CPE,49 although the FCC stopped short of repealing the intercon-
nection requirements altogether.50
The rationale underlying previous examples of mandated inter-
connection and standardization, as well as the evolution of regulatory 
policy since those restrictions were initially adopted, indicates that 
broadband policy would be better served if such efforts were directed 
towards identifying and increasing the competitiveness of the last 
mile, which remains the industry segment that is the most concen-
trated and protected by entry barriers. Restated in terms of the layered 
model, decisions about whether to regulate the logical layer should 
not be driven by a desire to preserve and promote competition in the 
application and content layers. Such decisions should instead be 
guided by their impact on competition in the physical layer. 
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND THE 
CASE FOR NETWORK DIVERSITY 
Having determined that the central goal of broadband policy 
should be to foster greater competition in the last mile, the next logi-
cal step is to assess whether network neutrality would further or hin-
der that goal. The analysis will examine two different dimensions of 
economic performance: “static efficiency” and “dynamic efficiency.” 
Static efficiency holds the quantity of inputs and the available tech-
nology constant and asks whether goods and services are being pro-
duced using the fewest resources and are being allocated to those 
consumers who place the highest value on them. Static efficiency is 
traditionally measured according to the most familiar metrics of eco-
nomic welfare, such as the maximization of consumer and total sur-
plus and the minimization of average cost and deadweight loss.  
This analysis reveals that network neutrality may impair static ef-
ficiency in two ways. First, standardization necessarily reduces eco-
nomic welfare by limiting product variety. Second, and more 
importantly for our purposes, network neutrality can impede the 
emergence of competition in the last mile by reinforcing the economic 
characteristics that drive markets for telecommunications networks 
towards natural monopoly (i.e., high up-front costs and network eco-
nomic effects). To the extent that network neutrality is imposed to 
limit monopoly or oligopoly power, it can have the perverse effect of 
entrenching industry concentration by short-circuiting one of the most 
natural ways to mitigate market failure. Network neutrality is also 
hamstrung by the practical consideration that the regulatory tools tra-
ditionally used to promote static efficiency are unlikely to work well 
 
49. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review of Part 68 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,944, 24,951–53 ¶¶ 20–23 (2000). 
50. See id. at 24949–50 ¶¶ 16–17. 
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in industries undergoing rapid technological change. Those tools are 
also unlikely to be effective when the demands that end users are 
placing on the network are becoming increasingly heterogeneous in 
terms of quality of service and content. 
While static efficiency represents the most widely accepted 
measure of economic performance, it raises an important question by 
failing to take into account the fact that the distribution of inputs and 
technology is itself subject to change and optimization. Such consid-
erations fall within the realm of dynamic efficiency, which treats input 
availability and technology as endogenous. Put another way, while 
static efficiency optimizes placement along a production possibility 
frontier, dynamic efficiency also addresses the prospect that the pro-
duction possibility frontier could shift outwards. Indeed, the growing 
importance of technology and infrastructure and the accelerating pace 
of technological change have made dynamic efficiency an increas-
ingly important consideration in the modern economy. 
In terms of dynamic efficiency, my analysis draws on the litera-
ture exploring the impact of compulsory access on investment incen-
tives in order to examine how mandating interconnection can 
discourage the build-out of new last-mile technologies. Mounting em-
pirical evidence confirms that the imposition of interconnection and 
standardization regimes of the type envisaged by network neutrality 
proponents to redress concentration in the last mile may in fact have 
the opposite effect. Network diversity, in contrast, would avoid these 
problems and could facilitate entry by new last-mile providers.  
These conclusions suggest that society might be better off if poli-
cymakers were to embrace a network diversity principle. I close by 
offering a few brief observations about the noneconomic justifications 
offered in support of network neutrality. I find that while they are ana-
lytically coherent, they are insufficiently theorized to provide a basis 
for a coherent regulatory regime. 
A. Network Neutrality and Static Efficiency 
This Section evaluates network neutrality in terms of static effi-
ciency. It first discusses how compulsory standardization of protocols 
like TCP/IP can reduce economic welfare both by reducing product 
variety and by favoring certain applications over others. Close analy-
sis reveals that mandating interconnection is inherently nonneutral. 
Then, the Section describes how network neutrality can have the per-
verse effect of reinforcing the sources of market failure that have his-
torically been regarded as the reason that markets for last-mile 
technologies have remained so concentrated. This analysis suggests 
that broadband policy might well be better off if Congress and the 
FCC were to embrace network diversity as a central guiding principle. 
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1. The Potential Welfare Gains from Network Diversity and the 
Inherent Nonneutrality of Network Neutrality 
The regime of mandatory interconnection and protocol standardi-
zation envisioned by network neutrality proponents would have a po-
tentially dramatic impact on static efficiency that is often obscured 
under the price-theoretic approach that dominates law and economics 
scholarship. Price-theoretic analyses assume, explicitly or implicitly, 
that competing goods serve as perfect substitutes for one another. This 
in turn allows economic welfare to be determined solely by price. 
Consumer surplus is created when consumers pay prices that are less 
than the maximum they would be willing to pay, and producer surplus 
is created when producers receive prices that exceed the minimum 
price they would be willing to accept. In a price-theoretic world, then, 
economic welfare consists solely of the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus.  
A different situation obtains when products are differentiated.51 
The economics of product differentiation acknowledge that utility can 
also increase by allowing consumers to obtain goods that fit better 
with their ideal preferences.52 The welfare benefits from product dif-
ferentiation are not observable in the classic price-quantity space that 
dominates economic analysis. They nonetheless remain an important 
potential source of economic welfare. Conversely, standardization can 
“prevent the development of promising but unique and incompatible 
new systems.”53 The concomitant reduction in product variety can 
represent an important, but often overlooked, source of welfare loss.54  
These problems appear more acute when the focus is shifted from 
standardization in the abstract to the particular form of standardization 
favored by network neutrality proponents. Adoption of any set of pro-
tocols has the inevitable effect of favoring certain types of applica-
tions and disfavoring others. Even worse, standardization also has the 
inevitable effect of putting the government in the position of picking 
technological winners and losers. In addition, to be effective, such 
intervention would likely be required at an early stage when the un-
 
51. For an overview of the economics of product differentiation, see Christopher S. Yoo, 
Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 236–46, 251–67 (2004). 
52. See Yoo, supra note 33, at 271–72; Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment 
to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1617–18 (2003). 
53. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 93, 110 (1994). 
54. See id. (noting that “the primary cost of standardization is loss of variety: consumers 
have fewer differentiated products to pick from”); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Stan-
dardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71 (1985) (counting 
“reduction in variety” as one of the “important social costs” of standardization). 
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derlying technology is still in a state of flux.55 In short, it appears that 
the term “network neutrality” is something of a misnomer. 
Consider TCP/IP, which remains the de facto standard set of pro-
tocols on the Internet.56 Given the Internet’s meteoric success, it is 
tempting to treat the status quo as the relevant baseline and to place 
the burden on those who would deviate from it,57 although, as I will 
discuss later, there are significant conceptual problems associated 
with taking such an approach.58 As noted earlier, one of the distin-
guishing features of TCP/IP is that it routes packets anonymously on a 
“first come, first served” basis without regard to the application with 
which they are associated. It also transmits packets on a “best efforts” 
basis without any guarantee of success. 
This approach to routing packets was uncontroversial when usage 
restrictions prohibited commercial use of the Internet and the network 
was used primarily by technology-oriented academics to share text-
based communications that were not particularly sensitive to delays of 
up to a second. In recent years, however, the environment in which 
the Internet operates has changed radically.59 The transformation of 
the Internet from a medium for academic communication into a mass 
market phenomenon has greatly complicated the decisions faced by 
network owners.60 Indeed, the number of possible connections in-
creases exponentially with network size.61 The commercialization 
made possible by the privatization of the Internet has greatly in-
creased the heterogeneity and variability of Internet usage. The shift 
from text-based applications, such as e-mail, to more bandwidth-
intensive applications, such as webpage downloading and file trans-
fers, has dramatically increased the volume of end-user demand. The 
emergence of applications that are increasingly sensitive to delay 
(even at the cost of lower accuracy and increased distortion62) such as 
VoIP and streaming video, has created demand for even greater reli-
ability in throughput rates and quality of service and is creating pres-
sure for the deployment of “policy-based routers,” which break from 
TCP/IP by assigning higher priority to packets associated with time-
 
55. See Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future 
Structure of the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT 
MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 200–03 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach 
& Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999). 
56. For a preliminary version of this argument, see Yoo, supra note 36, at 34–37. 
57. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 6, at 929, 957, 971; Wu, supra note 6, at 91.  
58. See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
59. See generally Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the 
Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
INTERNET TECH. 70 (2001). 
60. See Yoo, supra note 36, at 35. 
61. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Com-
plex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1698 (2005). 
62. See Jeffrey K MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Economic FAQs About the Internet, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1994, at 75, 87. 
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sensitive applications.63 Furthermore, the unexpected interactions 
among network components that are the hallmark of complex systems 
can be quite sensitive to variability of demand.64 Increases in the vari-
ability of network traffic can thus greatly impede network perform-
ance even if, on average, utilization of network capacity remains quite 
low.65
Furthermore, the packet anonymity inherent in TCP/IP may be in-
terfering with network owners’ attempts to add security features de-
signed to foster e-commerce or to protect against viruses and other 
hostile elements that are proliferating on the Internet. In addition, the 
Internet’s shift away from academically-oriented users who enjoyed a 
similar degree of institutional support and shared certain common 
institutional norms has increased the justification for moving respon-
sibility for system maintenance and management away from end users 
and towards the network’s core.66
These considerations make network management quite challeng-
ing. Although it is theoretically possible for network owners to re-
spond to some of these demands by expanding bandwidth,67 the fact 
that application designers are waiting in the wings with ever more 
bandwidth-intensive applications dictates that there is no compelling 
reason to believe that bandwidth will necessarily increase faster than 
demand, especially in light of the fact that the number of potential 
connections goes up exponentially with the number of computers 
added to the system.68 In addition, decisions about capacity expansion 
can be difficult when facing uncertainty about the magnitude, hetero-
geneity, and variability of the demand that will be placed on the net-
work. Decisionmaking is complicated still further by the “lumpiness” 
of network capacity created by the indivisibility of fixed costs and the 
fact that increasing network capacity typically takes a considerable 
amount of time.69  
In such an environment, it seems counter-productive to tie net-
work owners’ hands by limiting the number of ways in which they 
can manage network demand. An example from the early days of the 
Internet illustrates the point nicely. In 1987, end users began to rely 
 
63. See Yoo, supra note 36, at 35–36; David D. Clark, Adding Service Discrimination to 
the Internet, 20 TELECOMM. POL’Y 169, 174 (1996); James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet 
Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1553, 1574 (2002) (book review). 
64. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 61, at 1702–05. 
65. See Jeffery K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Some FAQs About Usage-Based 
Pricing, 28 COMPUTER NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 257, 259 (1995). 
66. Yoo, supra note 36, at 35, 36–37. 
67. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 47. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see 
infra notes 269–270 and accompanying text. 
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
69. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and 
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 912 (2003); Spulber & Yoo, supra 
note 61, at 1715, 1722. 
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increasingly on personal computers instead of dumb terminals to con-
nect to what was then the NSFNET. The increased functionality pro-
vided by the shift to personal computers increased the intensity of the 
demands that end users were placing on the network. The resulting 
congestion caused terminal sessions to run unacceptably slowly, and 
the fact that fixed cost investments could not be made instantaneously 
created an inevitable delay in adding network capacity. This is pre-
cisely the type of technology- and demand-driven exogenous shock 
that makes network management so difficult. NSFNET’s interim solu-
tion was to reprogram its routers to give terminal sessions higher pri-
ority than file transfer sessions until additional bandwidth could be 
added.70 Indeed, such solutions need not be temporary: in a techno-
logically dynamic world, one would expect that the relative costs of 
different types of solutions to change over time. Sometimes increases 
in bandwidth would be cheaper than reliance on network management 
techniques, and vice versa. It would thus be short-sighted to tie net-
work managers’ hands by limiting their flexibility in their choice of 
network management solutions. 
Network neutrality also can restrict the network’s functionality.71 
A close analysis of the “end-to-end argument”72 — often invoked as 
one of the foundations of network neutrality73 — demonstrates this 
point. The end-to-end argument asserts that application-specific func-
tionality should be confined to the hosts operating at the edge of the 
network and that the core of the network should be as simple and gen-
eral as possible. The rationale underlying this argument is based in 
cost-benefit analysis. Increasing the functions performed in the core 
of the network can improve the functionality of the network, but only 
at the cost of reduced network performance. The problem is that all 
applications would have to bear the costs associated with the reduc-
tion in performance even if they gain no compensating benefits. This 
tradeoff can be avoided if the core of the network performs only those 
functions that benefit almost all applications and if higher-level, ap-
plication-specific functions are confined to the servers operating at the 
network’s edge.  
Although the end-to-end argument is frequently invoked in sup-
port of network neutrality, such claims are misplaced. The architects 
of the end-to-end argument candidly reject calls to elevate end-to-end 
 
70. See MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 65, at 259. 
71. The discussion that follows draws on the more extended analysis in Yoo, supra note 
36, at 41–46. 
72. See generally J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984) (providing the seminal statement of end-to-
end). 
73. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 34–48, 156–61; Cooper, supra note 6, at 180–81; 
Lemley & Lessig, supra note 6, at 930–34; Solum & Chung, supra note 6, at 823–38; Wu, 
supra note 6, at 146. 
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into a regulatory mandate as “too simplistic.”74 Correct application of 
the cost-benefit tradeoff lying at the heart of the end-to-end argument 
requires “subtlety of analysis” and can be “quite complex.”75 Indeed, 
the architects of end-to-end acknowledge that circumstances exist 
under which application of end-to-end would do more harm than 
good.76 Properly construed, end-to-end calls for implementation on a 
case-by-case basis rather as a blanket regulatory prohibition.77
There is no reason to believe a priori that giving preference to in-
novations operating at the network’s edge over innovations in the 
network’s core will prove to be beneficial in all cases. Two examples 
from the early days of the Internet illustrate the problem. The intro-
duction of digital transmission technologies required the deployment 
of protocols that were not interoperable with the existing analog net-
work. This necessitated the introduction of computer processing into 
the core of the network to engage in “protocol conversion.”78 The 
emergence of “voice messaging services,” such as voice mail and ad-
vance calling, posed similar problems. Voice messaging services ap-
peared to function best when their capabilities were designed directly 
into the telephone switch.79 Both developments were inconsistent with 
the regime of transparency and interoperability envisioned by the sec-
ond Computer Inquiry as well as the simplistic reading of the end-to-
end argument. After considerable regulatory wrangling, the FCC per-
mitted the deployment of both innovations, notwithstanding their in-
 
74. See Saltzer et al., supra note 72, at 280; accord id. at 285 (calling end-to-end a guide-
line rather than an absolute rule). 
75. Id. at 281, 284. To take but one example, the desirability of end-to-end depends in 
part on the length of the file. If a system drops one message per one hundred messages sent, 
the probability that all packets will arrive correctly decreases exponentially as the length of 
the file (and thus the number of packets composing the file) increases. See id. at 280–81; see 
also Clark, supra note 63, at 171. 
76. See David P. Reed et al., Commentaries on “Active Networking and End-to-End Ar-
guments,” IEEE NETWORK, May/June 1998, at 69, 69 n.1 (noting that “[t]here are some 
situations where applying an end-to-end argument is counterproductive” while suggesting 
that such circumstances will be rare). 
77. See id. at 70; Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 59, at 71, 80; accord Samrat Bhat-
tacharjee et al., Active Networking and the End-to-End Argument, 1997 PROC. INT’L CONF. 
ON NETWORK PROTOCOLS 220, 221; cf. Dale N. Hatfield, Preface, 8 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 1, 3 (2000).  
78. See Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations 
(Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 979–80 ¶¶ 33–34 (1986) 
[hereinafter Computer III Phase I Order], vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. 
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Petition for Wavier of Section 64.702 of 
the Commission’s Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 1057 (1985); 
Petition of AT&T Co. for Limited and Temporary Waiver of 47 CFR Section 64.702 Re-
garding Its Provision of Unregulated Services Externally to the AT&T-C Network, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 505 (Common Carrier Bur. rel. Nov. 27, 
1985) (FCC 84-561); Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Statement of Principles, 95 
F.C.C.2d 584, 594 ¶ 22, 595 ¶ 24 (1983). 
79. Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 78, at 971–73 ¶¶ 17–19, 1109–14 ¶¶ 307–
317. 
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consistency with the commitment to interoperability.80 Had the FCC 
adhered to its policy of preserving the ability of unaffiliated providers 
to obtain transparent access to the network, these innovations would 
not have been allowed to emerge. 
Simply put, any choice of standardized protocol has the inevitable 
effect of favoring certain applications and disfavoring others, just as 
TCP/IP discriminates against applications that are time sensitive and 
end-to-end favors innovation at the edge over innovation in the core. 
As I will subsequently discuss in some detail, whether mandating 
network neutrality would be socially beneficial is a complicated ques-
tion that depends on myriad considerations, including the level of ag-
gregate demand, heterogeneity of network uses, the variability in 
network traffic flows, end users’ need for network reliability, and the 
extent to which technological change is reorganizing the natural 
boundaries between levels that were previously separated by a natural 
interface, notwithstanding the many claims to the contrary.81 In short, 
the desirability of complete standardization and interoperability is an 
empirical question that cannot be answered a priori.  
Indeed, the nonneutrality inherent in the choice of baseline prin-
ciples becomes even clearer when the debates about network neutral-
ity are viewed through the lens of the broader debates about 
jurisprudence. In essence, it is the same insight driving the critique of 
Herbert Wechsler’s espousal of so-called “neutral principles”82 as 
well as the failure of attempts to advance a value-neutral conception 
of equality.83 The choice of underlying baseline is an inherently nor-
mative judgment. In other words, although there is hope that princi-
ples can be neutrally applied once they have been established, the 
choice of foundation principles is inevitably never neutral.  
It would thus be a mistake to regard network neutrality as inher-
ently neutral,84 as the engineering embodiment of a competitive mar-
 
80. See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,905, 21,955–58 ¶¶ 100–105 (1996), aff’d sub nom. Bell Atl. 
Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Computer III Phase I Order, supra note 
78, at 1100–09 ¶ 289–306, 1112–14 ¶¶ 313–317; Petitions for Waiver of Section 64.702 of 
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations to Provide Certain Types of Protocol Conversion 
with their Basic Network, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 84-561 (F.C.C. rel. Nov. 
28, 1984); Petition for Waiver of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 1057 (1985)  
81. See infra notes 157–163 and accompanying text. 
82. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1959). 
83. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
84. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 37, 156; Wu, supra note 6, at 91. Lessig’s later 
work concedes that no network design is neutral and instead describes network neutrality as 
an attempt to eliminate certain kinds of discrimination. Lessig, supra note 77, at 1042. For 
the reasons stated above, reconstructing network neutrality in terms of discrimination and 
equality simply restates the underlying normative issues in different terms without resolving 
them. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
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ket,85 or as the best way to reflect technological humility,86 as some 
network neutrality proponents have suggested. At best, it represents a 
casual empirical conjecture about how competition and innovation 
can best be promoted under current circumstances. At worst, it repre-
sents an attempt to use engineering principles to impart legitimacy to 
a naked normative commitment.87 Like any baseline principle, it must 
be supported by substantial normative and empirical justification be-
fore being imposed as an absolute mandate. Until that occurs, the 
more technologically humble position would appear to be permitting 
network diversity through nonregulation, rather than mandating the 
use of any particular set of protocols.88
Indeed, the ambiguity in the end-to-end argument is arguably re-
flected in the evolution of Lessig’s views over time. His initial writ-
ings referred to end-to-end as a “principle” that should not be 
“violated.”89 His more recent work regards end to end as a policy that 
constitutes a “thumb on the scale of any network design.”90 While this 
retreat from regarding end-to-end as an absolute principle is welcome, 
its transformation into a policy preference does not completely ad-
dress the analytical shortcomings I have identified. Erecting a policy 
preference in favor of the end-to-end argument has the inevitable con-
sequence of foreclosing deviations from interoperability when the 
effect of those deviations is ambiguous. In a world in which it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to forecast with any degree of confidence 
which practices are likely to prove successful, such an approach could 
well foreclose a wide range of developments that would be welfare 
enhancing. As a result, it would be more appropriate to adopt policies 
that permit experimentation with different business models and to 
 
85. See Wu, supra note 27, at 145–46 (arguing that network neutrality is the best way to 
promote “meritocratic” competition based on the “survival-of-the-fittest”); Gerald Faul-
haber, Comments at Workshop on the Policy Implications of End-to-End at Stanford Law 
School (Dec. 1, 2000) (noting that network neutrality proponents seem to regard the end-to-
end argument as the engineering analog to a competitive market), available at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/e2e/papers/Fal.pdf. 
86. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 35, 39. 
87. In the words of the then-Executive Director of the Computer Science and Telecom-
munications Board of the National Research Council: 
Although the embrace of engineering principles such as [end-to-end] 
appears to impart a legitimacy to certain kinds of advocacy, that ad-
vocacy reaches beyond the engineering to the ideology long associ-
ated with the Internet. It is an ideology that associates the Internet 
with freedoms of various kinds, autonomy for the users, and innova-
tion. 
Marjory S. Blumenthal, End-to-End and Subsequent Paradigms, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. 
U.-DET. C.L. 709, 710. 
88. See infra Part V. 
89. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Foreword, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987, 991, 993–94 (2000); 
Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1405, 1414–15 (1999). 
90. Lessig, supra note 7, at 1040. 
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forbid changes in practice only after the demonstration of clear anti-
competitive effects. 
2. Network Diversity and the Causes of Market Failure in the Last 
Mile 
There is also considerable danger that mandating interconnection, 
nondiscrimination, rate regulation, and standardization would rein-
force the very sources of market failure that network neutrality is sup-
posed to redress. The central concern of network neutrality is that 
DSL and cable modem providers are using their control over the last 
mile to restrict the ability of applications and content providers to 
reach end users. In this respect, it is motivated by the same policy 
concerns animating regulatory intervention into markets for CPE, long 
distance, and enhanced services. Two factors are typically cited as the 
reasons for the high degree of concentration in markets for last-mile 
services. The classic source of market concentration is the supply-side 
economies of scale that arise when entry requires significant, up-front 
investments. More recently, attention has also focused on the demand-
side economies of scale created by “network economic effects,” 
which arise when the value of the network is largely determined by 
the number of people connected to it. Both forces tend to give the 
large players a decisive advantage. In the most extreme case, they 
create natural monopolies. 
Interestingly, my analysis reveals that network neutrality can have 
the perverse effect of reinforcing both of these sources of market fail-
ure.91 In other words, network neutrality can actually make matters 
worse by short-circuiting one of the most promising ways that smaller 
players use to survive when confronted with unexhausted returns to 
scale. If true, this raises the specter that network neutrality could be 
the source of, rather than the solution to, market failure. 
a. Supply-Side Determinants of Natural Monopoly: Large, Up-Front 
Investments 
How network neutrality can reinforce the supply-side forces that 
tend to concentrate markets for network services is best understood in 
terms of the classic source of scale economies: large, up-front, sunk-
cost investments.92 Although the issue is not free from dispute,93 the 
 
91. For a preliminary sketch of this argument, see Yoo, supra note 36, at 60–65. 
92. For more formal discussions of the impact of large, up-front costs on market concen-
tration, see Yoo, supra note 51, at 226–27, 232–33; Yoo, supra note 52, at 1596–98. As the 
theory of contestable markets demonstrates, large, up-front investments are not economi-
cally problematic unless they are “sunk,” i.e., unrecoverable upon exit. Firms that are able to 
recoup their up-front investments if forced to exit the market will not be deterred from en-
tering in the first place. The ongoing prospect of potential entry can discipline price in much 
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high up-front investments needed to establish the wires and central 
offices needed to establish telephone service have historically been 
regarded as turning local telephony into a natural monopoly.94 The 
presence of large, up-front capital investments gives the largest firms 
a decisive economic advantage. The ability to spread those invest-
ments over a larger customer base allows them to underprice their 
smaller competitors.95 This allows them to capture a still larger share 
of the market, which in turn causes the cost advantage to widen still 
further. Eventually, the cost advantage enjoyed by the largest player 
widens to the point where it is able to drive all of its competitors out 
of the market.96 In that case, even markets that are initially competi-
tive are doomed to collapse into monopolies. 
Natural monopoly does not necessarily imply that entry will never 
occur. A smaller rival can try to enter by dropping its price so low that 
it is able to generate sufficient volume to leapfrog over the largest 
player and become the low-cost producer. Such gambits are difficult 
to execute, since pricing below cost requires incurring substantial 
economic losses, and the dominant player can match any such price 
cuts while incurring smaller economic losses.97 It makes no difference 
 
the same manner as direct competition. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE 
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 288–93 (rev. ed. 1987). Historically, 
investments in network infrastructure have not been transferable to other uses upon exit and 
thus were properly regarded as sunk. The emergence of spectrum-based transmission tech-
nologies has the potential of converting the investments needed to enter the local telephone 
market from sunk costs into fixed costs, a development that promises to revolutionize the 
telephone industry. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Death of the Telephone Model of Regula-
tion (forthcoming 2006). 
93. See Yoo, supra note 92 (reviewing the dispute over whether local telephone service 
has historically been and currently remains a natural monopoly). 
94. See, e.g., HUBER ET AL., supra note 22, at 2; JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN 
TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3 (2000). 
95. For example, if a producer must incur $1,000 in up-front costs to enter the market, the 
up-front costs would contribute the following amounts toward unit (i.e., average) cost: 
 Contribution  Contribution 
Quantity to Unit Cost Quantity to Unit Cost
100 $10.00   600 $1.67 
200 $5.00   700 $1.43 
300 $3.33   800 $1.25 
400 $2.50   900 $1.11 
500 $2.00 1000 $1.00 
If the impact from the amortization of up-front costs dominates the impact of variable costs, 
average cost will decline. Note that the impact of up-front costs tends to decay exponentially 
as the quantity over which the up-front costs are spread increases. 
96. When a single firm will be able to serve the entire market at a lower cost than could 
two producers, a market is said to be “subadditive.” See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 92, at 
17–19. 
97. See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1982). If any-
thing, the supracompetitive rents may give the incumbent greater incentive and a greater 
ability to fight to protect its monopoly. See Bresnahan, supra note 55, at 163; Richard J. 
Gilbert & David M.B. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 
AM. ECON. REV. 514 (1982); Stephen C. Salop et al., A Bidding Analysis of Special Interest 
Regulation: Raising Rivals’ Costs in a Rent Seeking Society, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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from the standpoint of competition policy which player emerges. 
Horizontal competition, in which multiple producers vie with each 
other within a market, is unsustainable. The best that one could hope 
for is a form of vertical competition, in which a succession of mo-
nopolists competes for the market.98
What has been largely overlooked is how allowing networks to 
differentiate themselves can also alleviate the economies of scale as-
sociated with declining average costs.99 It is the fact that price is the 
only dimension along which firms can compete that gives the largest 
players their decisive advantage. A different equilibrium can obtain if 
competitors are allowed to compete along dimensions other than 
price. If so, a smaller player may be able to survive notwithstanding 
lower sales volumes and higher unit costs (and thus higher prices) by 
tailoring its network towards services that a subsegment of the market 
values particularly highly. The greater value provided by the differen-
tiation of the network allows a specialized provider to generate suffi-
cient revenue to cover its up-front costs even though its volume is 
significantly smaller than that of the leading players. 
How product differentiation can mitigate the tendency towards 
natural monopoly caused by significant fixed costs is most easily un-
derstood through the theory of “monopolistic competition” pioneered 
by Edward Chamberlin.100 Monopolistic competition adopts the same 
assumptions as the standard natural monopoly model except for two: 
it allows for the possibility of new entry and it relaxes the assumption 
that competing products constitute perfect substitutes.  
In the short run, firms engaged in monopolistic competition set 
price in exactly the same manner as monopolists. Should the resulting 
equilibrium price exceed average cost, the producer may earn short-
run supracompetitive profits. Were products undifferentiated, this 
short-run equilibrium would be stable. Because competition would be 
restricted to a single dimension — price — further entry would be 
futile, since scale economies would allow the producer with the high-
est volume to seize the entire market.  
 
 
OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 102 (Edward T. 
Rogowsky & Bruce Yandle eds., 1984).  
98. Indeed, some commentators have proposed using periodic franchise bidding to induce 
a form of vertical competition. The hope is that iterated franchise bidding would effectively 
make sunk cost investments more like recoupable fixed costs. See Harold Demsetz, Why 
Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (1968); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate 
Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 98, 113–16 (1972). 
These proposals have been criticized for requiring as extensive government intervention as 
conventional rate regulation. See Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural 
Monopolies — in General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). 
99. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 248–49; Yoo, supra note 52, at 1603. 
100. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
(8th ed. 1962). For a more complete discussion of the literature on monopolist competition, 
see Yoo, supra note 51, at 236–41, 246–48, 252–64; Yoo, supra note 52, at 1602–18. 
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Allowing for the possibility of product differentiation causes the 
short-run equilibrium to become unstable. New producers can enter 
despite cost disadvantages by offering a product with attributes that 
differ from those offered by the incumbent. Entry by a new product 
causes the demand curve confronting existing products to shift in-
wards, as some customers shift their purchases to the new product. 
Under classic Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, entry by other 
variants continues until all of the supracompetitive returns have been 
dissipated, which occurs when the demand curve becomes tangent to 
the average cost curve.101  
The result is an equilibrium in which multiple players co-exist de-
spite the presence of unexhausted economies of scale. Even though 
entrants may operate at a cost disadvantage vis-à-vis their larger ri-
vals, they are able to survive by offering products designed to appeal 
to a smaller subsegment of the customer base. Conversely, preventing 
product differentiation could cause the market to devolve into a natu-
ral monopoly. Note also the key role played by short-run supracom-
petitive profits in this model. It is the presence of these profits that 
stimulates entry in the first place. 
                                                                                                                  
101. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 100, at 194–95. The indivisibility of fixed costs may 
lead to an exception known as the “integer problem” in which n firms might earn small 
profits while n + 1 firms would run losses. Any such profits should not be particularly sig-
nificant if the economy is sufficiently “large” (i.e., fixed costs are small relative to the size 
of the overall market). See Yoo, supra note 51, at 239–40. 
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How could such differentiation occur in the context of broad-
band? One way is through protocol nonstandardization, such as 
through the adoption of a different routing protocol. As discussed 
above, all protocols necessarily favor certain applications over oth-
ers.102 If discrete subgroups of end users place sufficiently different 
valuations on different types of applications, multiple networks will 
be able to coexist simply by targeting their networks towards the 
needs of different subgroups.103 If demand is sufficiently heterogene-
ous, the greater utility derived from allowing consumers to access 
consumer services that they value more highly can more than com-
pensate for any cost disadvantages resulting from the reduction in 
volume. Indeed, it is conceivable that network diversity might make it 
possible for three different last-mile networks to coexist: one opti-
mized for traditional Internet applications such as e-mail and website 
access, another incorporating security features to facilitate e-
commerce and to guard against viruses and other hostile aspects of 
Internet life, and a third that prioritizes packets in the manner needed 
to facilitate time-sensitive applications such as streaming media and 
VoIP.  
Network diversity allows for greater experimentation with differ-
ent ways to take advantage of technological differences. Consider, for 
example, the fact that wireless telephone networks in the U.S. have 
employed incompatible standards. The initial standard, known as 
Time Division Multiple Access (“TDMA”), is being replaced by 
Global System for Mobile Communications (“GSM”) and Code Divi-
sion Multiple Access (“CDMA”) without significantly inconvenienc-
ing consumers.104 In some cases wireless carriers are using different 
transmission protocols for voice and data communications in order to 
utilize the characteristics of the transmission medium in order to meet 
the different technical demands of each application.105 The experience 
with wireless telephony highlights the economic benefits that can flow 
from competition among standards. Had the U.S. followed Europe’s 
example and adopted a uniform standard for second-generation wire-
less telephony, it would have precluded the realization of the benefits 
associated with CDMA, which supports a broader range of data ser-
vices, makes more efficient use of spectrum, and provides the most 
 
102. See supra Part III.A.1. 
103. See Yoo, supra note 36, at 63; Speta, supra note 63, at 1569. 
104. See Neil Gandal et al., Standards in Wireless Telephone Networks, 27 TELECOMM. 
POL’Y 325, 326–27 (2003). 
105. See Submission of Telus Communications, Inc., Telecommunications Policy Re-
view 49–50 ¶ 121 (Aug. 15, 2005) (citing VIERI VANGHI ET AL., THE CDMA2000 SYSTEM 
FOR MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS 363 (2004)), available at http://www.telecomreview.ca/ 
epic/internet/intprp-gecrt.nsf/vwapj/TELUS-Submission.doc/$FILE/TELUS-
Submission.doc. 
32  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 19 
 
                                                                                                                 
straightforward migration path to the next generation of wireless tech-
nologies.106
Entering into exclusivity arrangements with respect to content 
represents another possible means for differentiating one’s network.107 
One of the best current examples is the manner in which direct broad-
cast satellite (“DBS”) provider DirecTV is using an exclusive pro-
gramming package known as “NFL Sunday Ticket” to enhance its 
ability to compete with cable television. Indeed, it appears that exclu-
sive access to NFL Sunday Ticket constitutes one of the major factors 
helping DBS emerge as a viable competitor to cable. If regulators 
were to view this exclusivity arrangement solely in static terms, they 
might be tempted to appease cable customers who have expressed 
frustration at their inability to purchase NFL Sunday Ticket by requir-
ing that the package be made available on both platforms. Doing so 
would reduce DBS’s ability to compete by eliminating one of the pri-
mary inducements to shift from cable to DBS.108 In other words, ban-
ning exclusivity would only serve to entrench the dominant position 
that local cable operators have historically enjoyed over multichannel 
video distribution, which has long represented one of the central pol-
icy problems confronting the television industry. 
Another example that should be familiar to practicing lawyers is 
Lexis’s efforts to differentiate itself from Westlaw. In past years, 
Lexis attempted to distinguish its services by obtaining exclusive ac-
cess to the full-text version of the New York Times.109 More recent 
efforts include Lexis’s acquisition of the exclusive rights to the 
Shepard’s citator system.110 This exclusivity arrangement is doubtless 
a source of frustration to those who previously accessed Shepard’s 
through Westlaw. That said, these exclusivity rights have helped 
Lexis to survive despite the significant advantages West enjoys by 
virtue of its role in publishing case reporters. It also has forced West-
law to develop a new product called Key Cite to compete with 
Shepard’s.  
These examples illustrate how using nonstandardized protocols 
and exclusive access to content — the precise practices that network 
neutrality would condemn — can in fact facilitate competition in the 
last mile. The implication is that public policy may be better served if 
 
106. See id. at 329–30; Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Prop-
erty Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 586–87 (2003). 
107. See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 
678 (1999) (noting how exclusivity “can serve to differentiate products and networks”). 
108. Interestingly, the NFL’s decision to start its own cable network may alter the current 
situation.  
109. See Marydee Ojala, Online, Past, Present and Future: Repetition, Reinvention, or 
Reincarnation, ONLINE, Jan. 11, 1997, at 63. 
110. See Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1700 n.87 (2000); Tobe Liebert, The New Generation of Citators, 
EXPERIENCE, Fall 1999, at 28, 29. 
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Congress and the FCC were to reject network neutrality in favor of a 
network diversity principle that would allow networks to differentiate 
their services in precisely this manner. It is possible that such network 
diversity may take some time to emerge. Indeed, the seminal analyses 
of production differentiation recognize that the initial industry en-
trants may well prefer to offer products that are quite similar.111 As 
entry increases, providers should begin to find it profitable to pursue 
more targeted strategies.112 Thus, policymakers should avoid impos-
ing regulations that would foreclose the emergence of network diver-
sity even in the absence of the imminent arrival of a new entrant 
offering differentiated services. Humility about policymakers’ ability 
to predict which business models will prove successful further under-
scores the importance of leaving open this possibility. 
b. Demand-Side Determinants of Natural Monopoly: Network 
Economic Effects 
The other force supposedly driving markets for telecommunica-
tions networks toward monopoly is network economic effects.113 
Network economic effects exist when the number of people connected 
to a network determines the network’s value, and the network be-
comes more valuable as more people become part of it.114 Because the 
value of telecommunications networks increase with the number of 
people attached to them, they have long been regarded as a paradig-
matic case in which network economic effects arise.115 Thus, network 
economic effects are often described as creating demand-side econo-
 
111. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 53–55, 56–57 (1929) 
(providing the classic analysis of the tendency towards excessive sameness in markets for 
differentiated products). 
112. See Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of 
Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 200 (1952) (providing a classic 
application of Hotelling’s approach in the context of electronic communications). 
113. See, e.g., Bresnahan, supra note 55, at 159–61; Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential 
Demand for Broadband Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet 
Content Providers, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 161–64 (2001); Michael L. Katz & Carl 
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 
(1985); Lemley & Lessig, supra note 6, at 942; Glen O. Robinson, The “New” Communica-
tions Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L. REV. 289, 323–25 (1996). 
114. One oft-cited example of network economic effects is the battle between Beta and 
VHS formats for video cassettes. Consumers choosing between the two formats purportedly 
cared less about the technical capabilities of each particular format and focused more on 
which format would be adopted by other consumers. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Positive 
Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92 (1990). Interestingly, close analysis of the 
historical record contradicts that VHS’s emergence as the prevailing format for videocas-
settes was the result of network economic effects. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. 
MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS AND MICROSOFT 120–27 (rev. ed. 2001). 
115. See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 424; Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 546 
(1998); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Trag-
edy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 139–40 (1994). 
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mies of scale that tend to favor the largest networks. If significant 
enough, these demand-side scale economies can give rise to a form of 
vertical competition that is quite similar to the one that can be created 
by supply-side economies of scale.116 The presence of network eco-
nomic effects means that an individual’s decision to change networks 
creates costs and benefits for other network users that the person mak-
ing the adoption decision does not bear. Many economists argue that 
the increase in the network’s value to other users represents a network 
externality and that the inability to internalize these costs and benefits 
can lead to inefficient outcomes.117
The claim that network economic effects can be a source of mar-
ket failure is subject to a number of caveats and criticisms that I have 
addressed in detail in other work and will not address at length 
here.118 The most important point for our purposes is the fact that dif-
ferentiation can ameliorate the demand-side economies of scale cre-
ated by network economic effects.119 If the smaller network is 
optimized for particular functions that a particular group of end users 
values particularly highly, those end users may be willing to join the 
smaller network notwithstanding the presence of network economic 
effects. The increase in value provided by network diversity can more 
than compensate for any reductions in value resulting from market 
size.120 Conversely, network neutrality threatens to preempt this po-
 
116. See Bresnahan, supra note 55, at 166–73. 
117. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innova-
tion, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941 (1986); Katz 
& Shapiro, supra note 113, at 100. 
118. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 278–85; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 69, at 921–33. A few 
brief comments will suffice to demonstrate my concerns. First, arguments that network 
externalities can lead to market failure are misplaced in the context of physical networks 
that can be owned, such as wireline telecommunications networks. Even if individual users 
may not be in a position to internalize all of the costs and benefits created by their network 
adoption decisions, the network owner will almost certainly be in a position to do so. Sec-
ond, network externalities can plausibly cause market failure only when the relevant mar-
kets are highly concentrated. As I will subsequently demonstrate, once the relevant 
geographic markets are properly defined, this is not the case with respect to last-mile broad-
band providers. See infra notes 274–275 and accompanying text. Furthermore, current mar-
ket shares are less significant in markets like broadband, which are undergoing explosive 
growth, when it is the network that will exist in the future, not the one that exists today, that 
determines consumer choice. Third, network neutrality advocates overlook the fact that any 
decision to switch networks necessarily involves two offsetting externalities. On the one 
hand, a person adopting a new technology increases the value of the new network. The 
inability to capture this benefit may make network users too reluctant to switch networks. At 
the same time, any decision to switch networks necessarily reduces the value of the old 
network. The fact that the end user switching networks does not bear these costs may make 
it too eager to switch. Whether end users switch networks too frequently or not frequently 
enough depends upon which of these two effects dominates.  
119. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 271–72. 
120. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 53, at 106 (“Customer heterogeneity and product 
differentiation tend to . . . sustain multiple networks. If the rival systems have distinct fea-
tures sought by certain customers, two or more systems may be able to survive by catering 
to consumers who care more about product attributes than network size.”). 
No. 1] Beyond Network Neutrality 35 
 
                                                                                                                 
tential solution by narrowing the dimensions along which firms can 
compete. Mandating the use of standardized protocols threatens to 
commodify bandwidth and force providers to compete solely on the 
basis of price and network size, which would in turn reinforce the ad-
vantages enjoyed by the largest players. There is thus a real danger 
that network neutrality could short-circuit one of the most sensible 
market-based solutions to the problems of market concentration.  
This dynamic is well illustrated by a simple, formal model put 
forth by Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner.121 The model hypothesizes 
the existence of two groups of network users, one with a preference 
for standard A and another with a preference for standard B. To reflect 
the value of network economic effects, the model includes a variable 
to represent the increase in utility that would be generated if both 
groups adopted the same standard. To reflect the value of diversity, it 
includes variables to represent the utility that each group would derive 
if permitted to use its preferred standard rather than the other stan-
dard.  
This simple model permits the comparison of three different 
states: standardization on group A’s preferred standard, standardiza-
tion on group B’s preferred standard, and incompatibility. The utility 
parameters make it possible to determine whether each possible out-
come represents a stable equilibrium or whether a group can increase 
its utility by deviating from the status quo. The model also allows for 
some basic welfare comparisons by determining which of these three 
possible outcomes provided the greatest utility.122
The results under this model depend on whether the value created 
by the network economic effects exceeds the value of product diver-
sity or vice versa. For example, suppose that both groups begin by 
adopting the standard preferred by group A. Group B users will shift 
to their preferred standard only if the utility they would derive from 
changing standards exceeds the decrease in utility from being part of a 
smaller network. Whether such a shift will be efficient depends on the 
magnitude of the utility group B derives from network diversity rela-
tive to the magnitude of returns to scale created by network economic 
effects. The same logic applies to the reciprocal case in which both 
groups begin by adopting the standard preferred by group B. In short, 
standardization is an equilibrium only if the utility created by network 
economic effects exceeds the utility created by network diversity for 
both groups.  
Furthermore, the possible equilibria have different welfare char-
acteristics. When incompatibility is optimal, it is necessarily a stable 
equilibrium. Standardization, on the other hand, may be a stable equi-
 
121. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 
(1986). 
122. Id. at 72. 
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librium even when it is not optimal. In this way, the model highlights 
the tradeoff inherent in the choice between standardization and vari-
ety. Indeed, it shows that circumstances exist under which there is too 
much standardization in equilibrium and where society would be bet-
ter off if the networks were permitted to deviate from the standard.123
This model operationalizes the intuitions about how network di-
versity can overcome the demand-side economies of scale created by 
network economic effects. So long as consumer preferences are suffi-
ciently heterogeneous, network diversity can mitigate whatever de-
mand-side economies of scale exist by virtue of network economic 
effects in much the same manner as it mitigates the supply-side 
economies of scale created by fixed costs. In addition, to the extent 
that different groups of end users derive utility from adopting one 
standard over another, network diversity can increase welfare by al-
lowing end users to consume network services that lie closer to their 
ideal preferences. The presence of multiple, incompatible networks 
may thus reflect nothing more than the network owners’ attempts to 
satisfy the underlying heterogeneity in consumer demand.124  
Indeed, a more elaborate formal model compares competition be-
tween nonproprietary standards with competition between proprietary 
standards. When the competing standards are nonproprietary, the 
market invariably tends to collapse into a natural monopoly centered 
on the first mover. The equilibria are more indeterminate when the 
competing standards are proprietary, with some scenarios favoring the 
first mover and some scenarios favoring the second. Equally impor-
tantly, this model shows that competition between proprietary stan-
dards may be more likely to lead to the adoption of the socially 
optimal technology.125  
It is thus far from clear that standardization and interconnection 
will yield the benefits envisioned by network neutrality proponents. 
The ambiguity of whether standardization will promote or hinder 
competition and economic welfare is demonstrated dramatically by 
the contradictory positions taken by network neutrality proponents. 
Rather than follow Lessig’s concern that network owners will be too 
eager to deviate from the existing standard,126 other scholars have 
drawn on the more traditional concern that network economic effects 
 
123. Id. at 73. 
124. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 53, at 106 (noting that “market equilibrium with 
multiple incompatible products reflects the social value of variety”); S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292 (1996) (“Where there are differences in preference regarding 
alternative standards, coexistence of standards is a likely outcome.”). 
125. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986). 
126. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 48, 168, 171, 176; Solum & Chung, supra note 6, at 
818–19. 
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may cause a welfare-reducing standard to become locked in.127 The 
underlying uncertainty suggests that arguments that interoperability is 
essential to preserving competition are too simplistic. 
3. Implementation Difficulties Caused by the Decommodification of 
Network Usage 
The FCC discovered that mandating interconnection and stan-
dardizing interfaces were not sufficient by themselves to induce com-
petition in complementary services. A recalcitrant local telephone 
company could effectively turn interconnection and standardization 
into a dead letter simply by providing affiliated providers of comple-
mentary services with interconnections that were cheaper or substan-
tially better in quality than those provided to unaffiliated providers. 
As a result, when mandating interconnection, the FCC has invariably 
found it necessary to prohibit local telephone companies from dis-
criminating against unaffiliated providers of CPE,128 long distance 
services,129 and enhanced services.130 The 1996 Act similarly forbids 
 
127. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 6, at 1045–54.  
128. The FCC initially prohibited AT&T from discriminating against independently pro-
vided CPE that satisfied certain minimum standards of safety. See Proposals for New or 
Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide 
Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), aff’d sub 
nom. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) (codified as amended at 47 
C.F.R. §§ 68.1–.614). The FCC also required the BOCs to file nondiscrimination compli-
ance plans confirming their adherence to the nondiscrimination criteria negotiated with CPE 
vendor and customer groups. See Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment and En-
hanced Services by the Bell Operating Telephone Companies and the Independent Tele-
phone Companies, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 143, 155 ¶¶ 80–84, on reconsideration, 3 
F.C.C.R. 22, 26 ¶ 29 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989). The FCC later delegated responsibility for establishing the technical require-
ments to industry-based standard-setting organizations. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Re-
view of Part 68 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 
24,944 (2000). 
129. As part of its efforts to promote competition in long distance prior to divestiture, the 
FCC required that AT&T interconnect with all long distance carriers on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of 
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177 (1980); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co., 72 
F.C.C.2d 724 (1979), aff’d, 659 F.2d 1092, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1981). During the breakup of 
AT&T, the court guarded against any lingering BOC favoritism towards AT&T by ordering 
the BOCs to provide non-Bell long distance carriers with interconnections that were equal in 
type, quality and price to those offered to AT&T. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 
131, 165, 195–96, 227 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 
U.S. 1001(1983). 
130. The first and second Computer Inquiries required that the local telephone companies 
make transmission services available through a tariff. Because tariffs establish uniform 
terms of service for all customers, the FCC concluded that the tariffing process was suffi-
cient to ensure that interconnection was nondiscriminatory. At the same time, it explicitly 
reserved the enforcement authority to remedy any problems that might arise. See Amend-
ment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 F.C.C.2d 
358, 435 ¶ 153 (1979) [hereinafter Computer II Tentative Decision]; Regulatory and Policy 
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and 
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incumbent local exchange carriers (“incumbent LECs” or “ILECs”) 
from discriminating in the rates charged for interconnection.131 It also 
requires that the interconnections provided to unaffiliated complemen-
tary service providers be equal in quality to those the ILEC provides 
to its own affiliates.132
Even the addition of a nondiscrimination mandate proved insuffi-
cient to prevent local telephone companies from using their bottleneck 
position to harm competition. The local telephone companies could 
evade this restriction simply by charging everyone interconnection 
fees that were prohibitively expensive. As noted earlier in the discus-
sion on vertical integration, so long as the local telephone company 
remained free to charge the monopoly price, compelling access to the 
bottleneck facility would not yield any consumer benefits.133 Charging 
the monopoly price would be nondiscriminatory in that it would apply 
equally to affiliated and unaffiliated providers alike. At the same time, 
overcharging its affiliate would not affect the local telephone com-
pany’s bottom line, since any losses incurred by the affiliate would be 
offset dollar-for-dollar by higher profits earned by the local telephone 
operations. As a result, regulations mandating interconnection with 
independent providers of long distance and enhanced services have 
invariably been accompanied by direct regulation of the rates local 
telephone companies charge for interconnection.134 This culminated in 
 
Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 282–83 ¶ 42 (1971) [hereinafter 
Computer I Final Decision]. The third Computer Inquiry similarly prohibited favoring par-
ticular customers and required local telephone companies to provide unaffiliated enhanced 
service providers with interconnections that were equal in quality to those offered to the 
services used by their affiliates. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Oper-
ating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 4299 
¶ 13, (1999). 
131. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D); see also id. § 251(c)(3) (requiring that access to unbun-
dled network elements be nondiscriminatory). 
132. Id. § 251(c)(2)(C). 
133. See supra Part II.B. 
134. For example, during the proceedings that provided the initial regulatory basis for the 
emergence of competition in long distance, the FCC required that interconnection charges 
be reasonable and indicated its willingness to take additional steps to enforce this require-
ment. See Establishment of Polices and Procedures for Consideration of Application to 
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Mi-
crowave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Commis-
sion’s Rules, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 940 ¶ 157 (1971), aff’d sub. nom. 
Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975). The court oversee-
ing the breakup of AT&T also implicitly recognized the problem when it required that ac-
cess tariffs be based on cost. See United States v. AT&T (MFJ), 552 F. Supp. 131, 233 
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The 
first and second Computer Inquiries required that the rates charged for interconnection be 
reasonable and embodied in a tariff. See Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 130, at 
435 ¶ 153; Computer I Final Decision, supra note 130, at 269 ¶ 8, 269–70 ¶ 10. The third 
Computer Inquiry created an elaborate pricing scheme to ensure the reasonableness of inter-
connection rates under CEI and ONA. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 
1046–53 ¶¶ 171–186 (1986) (discussing CEI), vacated and remanded sub nom. California 
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the provision of the 1996 Act specifically requiring that rates charged 
by ILECs for interconnection be just, reasonable,135 and “based on the 
cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network element.”136
The fact that the regime of interconnection and standardization 
favored by network neutrality proponents inevitably also requires 
mandating nondiscrimination and rate regulation dramatically lowers 
the likelihood that it will be successful. Not only are the regulatory 
tools needed to implement nondiscrimination and rate regulation 
problematic; they are particularly ineffective in a world in which 
communications are becoming increasingly decommodified. 
a. The Limitations of the Regulatory Tools 
Consider the methodology for implementing rate regulation. The 
difficulties in estimating the appropriate rate base and rate of return 
and the perverse incentives created by the existing approaches to rate 
regulation are well documented. Ratemaking inevitably devolved into 
disputes over the proper measure of costs, the proper rate of return, 
and whether particular investments were prudent.137 In addition, the 
classic ratemaking regime eliminates incentives to economize on costs 
and induces biases in the decision between capital and operating ex-
penditures.138 Although price caps were supposed to solve these prob-
lems, they have become bogged down in problems of their own.139 
 
v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture 
Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1 (1988) (discussing ONA). 
135. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D); see also id. § 251(c)(3) (requiring that rates for access 
to unbundled network elements (“UNEs”) be just and reasonable).  
136. See id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i). The statute further required that cost be “determined with-
out reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding.” Id. The FCC implemented 
this provision by basing rates on replacement cost, rather than historical cost. See Imple-
mentation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,857–58 ¶¶ 701–707 (1996). Another corol-
lary to interconnection arguably exists: unbundling. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 
1340–43, 1356 (1998); Weiser, supra note 7, at 69–70. I regard unbundling as an extension 
of the approach to interconnection, rather than a necessary corollary. In any event, the fact 
that the leading network neutrality proposals do not include an unbundling requirement 
obviates the need to address it further. 
137. See, e.g., JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 547–
622 (2d ed. 1988); 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 27–54 (1971); 2 
id. at 47–94; W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 364–74 
(3d ed. 2000); George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The 
Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). 
138. Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
139. See U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524–27 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating a 
price cap scheme as arbitrary and capricious); Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E. Sappington, 
Setting the X factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans, 16 J. REG. ECON. 5 (1999); Gregory J. 
Vogt, Cap-Sized: How the Promise of the Price Cap Voyage to Competition Was Lost in a 
Sea of Good Intentions, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 349 (1999). 
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Indeed, some empirical studies have suggested that price cap regula-
tion may have discouraged last-mile entry.140
Ensuring that charges for interconnection are reasonable and non-
discriminatory is all the more difficult when the product being regu-
lated is not a commodity and instead varies in terms of quality.141 
When product attributes are well defined and do not vary and the in-
terface is relatively simple, interconnection and nondiscrimination can 
focus on availability and price. As the Supreme Court has noted, the 
situation becomes less tractable when products vary in terms of their 
quality and reliability and the complexity of the interface allows for 
myriad nonprice-related ways that network owners can provide dis-
criminatory or substandard interconnection.142  
The implication is that regulators who wish to mandate intercon-
nection must do more than just regulate price. They must also create 
an elaborate number of secondary regulations to police quality of ser-
vice and other nonprice terms. In short, when the interface is complex, 
it forces the regulatory authorities to regulate almost all aspects of the 
business relationship.143 While quality regulation is intrusive and hard 
to administer under the best of circumstances, it becomes almost insu-
perable when quality varies widely. Indeed, as the diversity of uses to 
which users are putting the Internet has increased, quality and reliabil-
ity often becomes a product feature rather than a minimum standard 
that all providers must meet.144 This in turn makes it much more diffi-
cult to regulate quality of service without harming consumers.  
The FCC’s experience in attempting to implement interconnec-
tion regimes attests to these difficulties. Consider the history of the 
FCC’s attempt to foster competition in long distance. Early attempts 
 
140. See Jaison R. Abel, Entry into Regulated Monopoly Markets: The Development of a 
Competitive Fringe in the Local Telephone Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 289 (2002).  
141. See 1 KAHN, supra note 137, at 21–25; Eli M. Noam, Towards an Integrated Com-
munications Market: Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 209, 219 (1982). 
142. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 
398, 414 (2004) (recognizing that interconnection disputes are “highly technical” and multi-
faceted “given the incessant, complex, and costly changing interaction of competitive and 
incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations”); AT&T v. 
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 429 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation to the firm’s manage-
rial responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the more likely that [the 
administrative and social costs of compulsory sharing] will become serious.”); Gerald R. 
Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications Experiments, 15 INFO. 
ECON & POL’Y 73, 77–86 (2003) (arguing that interconnection mandates are likely to suc-
ceed only when the interface is simple, is easy to monitor, and requires little information; 
and tracing the failure of the initial regulatory attempts to stimulate competition in long 
distance and the failure of UNE access to provide competition in local telephony). 
143. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 244–46; LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 94, at 54–55; 
Faulhaber, supra note 142, at 81–82. 
144. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Unfulfilled Promise of Korean Telecommunica-
tions Reform, in LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA 169, 185–86 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2004) (de-
scribing how network providers can compete on quality and reliability as well as price). 
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to force AT&T to connect its local telephone systems with MCI and 
other independent long distance providers became embroiled in pro-
tracted disputes over the reasonableness of AT&T’s rates.145 The early 
antitrust cases against AT&T similarly involved extensive allegations 
that AT&T had discriminated against its competitors when providing 
interconnection.146 Following the breakup of AT&T, attempts to im-
plement the equal access requirement were marked by extended con-
troversies over the speed and diligence with which the BOCs were 
deploying this standardized interface.147  
The regulatory history of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is 
no more comforting. The validity of the regime that the FCC devel-
oped to set interconnection rates under the 1996 Act, known as Total 
Element Long Run Incremental Cost (“TELRIC”), was not resolved 
until the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Verizon Communications, 
Inc. v. FCC,148 some six years after the passage of the 1996 Act. 
Courts have been even more frustrated by the FCC’s inability to es-
tablish legally sufficient rules for defining the scope of the intercon-
nection requirements.149 In the meantime, complaints have mounted 
about the slow pace with which ILECs — defined to be companies 
offering local telephone service as of February 8, 1996 — are fulfill-
ing interconnection requests.150 Disputes over the quality of intercon-
 
145. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 22, at 136–40.  
146. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1131–32 (7th Cir. 1983) (al-
leging that AT&T’s interconnection procedures “utilized materials inadequate for the vol-
ume of business MCI was doing . . . and involved unduly complex and ineffective 
installation and maintenance procedures”); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 
1354–56 (D.D.C. 1981) (describing how AT&T used interconnection to discriminate against 
foreign CPE and long distance competitors); cf. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 
188, 189–90 & n.238 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting the ease with which local telephone companies 
can design their networks to discourage competitors in long distance and information ser-
vices), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
147. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1062–69 (D.D.C. 1983); In-
vestigation into the Quality of Equal Access Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 417 (rel. May 23, 1986); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Phase III: 
Establishment of Physical Connections and Through Routes among Carriers, Report and 
Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 869 (1985); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Phase III: TDX Peti-
tion for Rulemaking, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 4792 (F.C.C. Feb 1, 
1985). See generally Faulhaber, supra note 143, at 81–83. 
148. 535 U.S. 467 (2002). 
149. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (criticizing the 
FCC for its failure to develop lawful unbundling rules some eight years after the enactment 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996). The courts have repeatedly invalidated the FCC’s 
attempts to implement the interconnection requirements of the 1996 Act. See AT&T v. Iowa 
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–92 (1999); U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 564–77; U.S. 
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 
416, 422–24, 425–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
150. The most recent example of these disputes is the controversy surrounding “hot 
cuts,” which is the point when the line of a customer who is changing from one local tele-
phone company to another is disconnected from the old company’s switch and is recon-
nected to the new company’s switch. Until the line is reconnected, the telephone line will be 
out of service. Hot cuts are necessarily performed by the ILEC. The FCC initially ruled that 
the incumbent LECs’ ability to delay completing hot cuts represented a sufficient impair-
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nection have also provided the basis for the dispute that gave rise to 
the Supreme Court’s Trinko decision.151  
A similar pattern is seen in the regulatory experience with cable 
television.152 Because local distribution of cable programming re-
quired the deployment of a network of wires as extensive as that re-
quired to establish local telephone service, it too was regarded as a 
natural monopoly and subject to rate regulation. Subsequent empirical 
studies indicate that this effort was largely a failure. The evidence 
suggests that even though regulation caused nominal rates to drop, 
once other characteristics — such as the total number and quality of 
channels offered — are taken into account, rate regulation appears to 
have caused quality-adjusted rates to increase. Deregulation, con-
versely, caused quality-adjusted rates to fall.153 Congress’s and the 
FCC’s attempt to give unaffiliated programmers the right to carriage 
on cable systems by enacting the so-called “leased access” require-
ments failed miserably amid claims of excessive prices, poor quality 
of service, and bad faith.154 In the absence of comprehensive quality 
regulation, such problems appear to be intractable.155
Finally, the tools needed to implement interconnection, nondis-
crimination, rate regulation, and standardization do not function well 
in industries that are technologically dynamic. The existing ap-
proaches for regulating the reasonableness of interconnection rates are 
based on historical data, from which policymakers must attempt to 
anticipate and plan for change. It is for these reasons that regulation is 
thought to place a premium on predictability and continuity.156 Such 
 
ment to justify treating switching as a UNE, only to see that determination rejected on judi-
cial review. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers, Report, Order, Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978, 17,263–78 ¶¶ 459–475 (2003), rev’d sub nom. U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 568–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). On remand, the FCC abandoned its 
position and ruled that the incumbent LECs’ control of hot cuts was not sufficient to consti-
tute impairment. See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 
F.C.C.R. 2533, 2647–56 ¶¶ 210–221 (2005). 
151. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 
398, 403–05 (2004). 
152. For an overview, see Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 685–87 (2005). 
153. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD 
CABLE TELEVISION 2, 69–177, 208 (1997); Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 
Cable Act on Household Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422, 444–45 (2000). 
154. See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30–32 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 
1163–65; H.R. REP. NO. 102-628, at 39–40 (1992); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 
F.3d 957, 968–70 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, Order on Reconsidera-
tion of First Report, Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 
16,933, 16,937 ¶ 6 (1996); Donna M. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access 
Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 266–67 & n.122 (1992). 
155. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
156. See 2 KAHN, supra note 137, at 11–14; Noam, supra note 141, at 219–20. 
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an approach is nonsensical when the industry being regulated is un-
dergoing rapid technological change. 
The problem is compounded all the more by the fact that im-
provements in technology can render obsolete an interconnection 
point that was once a natural boundary between market players. Con-
sider what might happen after regulatory authorities compel intercon-
nection. The forces of competition naturally cause firms operating on 
either side of the interconnection interface to try to expand into terri-
tory occupied by other firms. To the extent that network neutrality 
forecloses this from occurring, it can stifle an important source of 
competition.157 Furthermore, more sweeping technological change can 
cause what was once a natural interface between two levels to shift or 
collapse. Requiring network owners to maintain standardized inter-
faces would have the inevitable effect of locking the existing inter-
faces into place. This government-imposed interconnection and 
standardization overlooks the extent to which the network (and not 
just the servers and applications running on it) can itself represent an 
important source of innovation.158 It also has the unfortunate effect of 
inhibiting the emergence of new technologies that transcend the 
boundaries that previously separated different segments of the indus-
try.159
The voice messaging services discussed above provide one ex-
ample of a technological change that reorganized the network’s natu-
ral interfaces.160 Another example is provided by the debate over 
“multiple ISP access” that represented the first round in the network 
neutrality debate.161 What has been largely overlooked is that the 
 
157. See Bresnahan, supra note 55, at 166–68. 
158. For example, network neutrality proponents often draw inspiration from the benefits 
from standardizing electric power.  See Ex parte Letter of Timothy Wu and Lawrence Les-
sig at 3, Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 1 (F.C.C. filed Aug. 22, 
2003) (CS Docket No. 02-52), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi? 
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6514683884; Wu, supra note 35, at 1165. These argu-
ments overlook the fact that the early years of the electric power industry witnessed an 
extended period of competition during which the initial standard, direct current (“DC”), was 
ultimately supplanted by a superior technology, alternating current (“AC”). Focusing policy 
too narrowly on how best to promote competition in the devices attached to the network can 
obscure the fact that innovation can also come from the network itself. Indeed, had the 
government standardized at an early stage in the industry, it would likely have deprived 
consumers of the technological benefits of an architecture based on AC current. See Yoo, 
supra note 36, at 66. 
159. I therefore disagree with proposals advocating regulation to keep existing interfaces 
open. See Werbach, supra note 2, at 65–66; Whitt, supra note 35, at 653–54; cf. Cooper, 
supra note 6, at 180 (advocating ensuring the openness of the physical layer by mandating 
the interconnection and interoperability inherent in end-to-end); Solum & Chung, supra 
note 6, at 844–54 (advancing a principle of layers integrity).  
160. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
161. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 6. This debate was originally framed in terms of 
“open access” to cable modem systems. The FCC has since changed the terminology to 
“multiple ISP access.” Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable 
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move towards proprietary ISPs is primarily the result of an exogenous 
change in the underlying technology. In the original narrowband 
world, in which end users connected to the Internet through conven-
tional telephone lines, the telephone company providing the end user 
connection did not need to maintain its own packet-switched network. 
It could simply connect the end users’ calls to the offices maintained 
by the ISP in the same manner as a conventional voice call. This is no 
longer true, however, after the transition to broadband. Both DSL and 
cable modem providers must maintain equipment, either a DSL access 
multiplexer (“DSLAM”) or a cable modem termination system 
(“CMTS”), to separate the stream of data packets from other types of 
communications. In this environment, last-mile providers no longer 
serve as mere pass-throughs. Instead, they must necessarily maintain a 
data network to hold the packet-switched traffic once it has been seg-
regated from the other traffic. They must also negotiate some type of 
interconnection agreement with another carrier so that this traffic can 
be routed to its final destination.162
Given that they were already performing many of the functions 
traditionally performed by ISPs, the logical next step was for last-mile 
broadband providers to negotiate their own agreements with backbone 
providers. The efficiency of this arrangement is eloquently demon-
strated by the AOL-Time Warner merger, which remains the only 
instance in which multiple ISP access has been mandated. Contrary to 
the original expectations of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), 
the unaffiliated ISPs that have obtained access to Time Warner’s ca-
ble modem systems have not created their own packet networks 
within Time Warner’s cable headends. Instead, traffic bound for these 
unaffiliated ISPs exits the headend via Time Warner’s backbone and 
is handed off to the unaffiliated ISP at an external location.163 The fact 
that the different ISPs are providing service through the same physical 
infrastructure means that the other ISPs cannot provide consumers 
with any improvements in speed, services, or access to content.164 In 
fact, unaffiliated ISPs have found it more economical to share Time 
Warner’s existing ISP facilities rather than build their own, which 
strongly suggests that integrating ISP and last-mile operations does in 
fact yield real efficiencies. This demonstrates how technological 
change can collapse a natural interface between what were once two 
different levels of production. 
Indeed, technological progress is beginning to put pressure on the 
distinction between the logical layer and the physical layer that is im-
 
and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 
4798, 4839 ¶ 72, (2002). 
162. See Yoo, supra note 36, at 33–34. 
163. See id. at 55–56. 
164. See id. at 57. 
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plicit in both the end-to-end argument and the vision of interconnec-
tion and standardization underlying the Computer Inquiries. As the 
FCC recently noted, the line between network transmission and com-
puter processing has become increasingly blurred.165 Technologists 
have begun to suggest that distinguishing between the physical and 
the logical layer violates technological neutrality and that policymak-
ing would be better facilitated if the two were regarded as a single 
layer.166
In summary, the complexity of the interface, the increasing het-
erogeneity of end users’ demands, and the pace of technological 
change are reducing the utility of the regulatory tools upon which 
policymakers have traditionally relied to manage interconnection, 
nondiscrimination, rate regulation, and standardization. It is particu-
larly telling that two noted scholars of network industries not noted 
for deregulatory views have suggested that access regimes have 
proven so unworkable that they should be abandoned.167  
b. Content and the Need for Editorial Discretion 
The effectiveness of the existing regulatory tools is further limited 
by the fact that they were developed with respect to the person-to-
person communications associated with common carriage. As a result 
they are not well suited to regulating networks used for conveying 
media content.168 When content is involved, policymakers have long 
recognized the importance of giving the conduit editorial control over 
the information being conveyed.169
A moment’s reflection will confirm the important role that edito-
rial discretion plays when content is involved. For example, consider 
what would occur if freelance writers were given a right of nondis-
criminatory access to a prominent news magazine, such as Time or 
Newsweek. Doing so would deprive readers of any guarantee that the 
articles contained in any issue would avoid redundancy and cover all 
of the leading stories. It would also eliminate the magazine’s ability to 
 
165. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 13, at 14,890 ¶ 70. 
166. See J. Scott Marcus & Douglas C. Sicker, Layers Revisited 8–11 (Sept. 13, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the 33rd Telecommunications Policy Research Con-
ference), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/492/Layers%20Revisited% 
20v0.4.pdf. 
167. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecom-
munications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 
(1999). 
168. See Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” 
and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1050–62 (1997) (tracing the origins of 
the regulatory distinction between broadcasting and common carriage). 
169. See, e.g., J. MacKie-Mason et al., Service Architecture and Content Provision: The 
Network Provider as Editor, 20 TELECOMM. POL’Y 203 (1996) (providing an early analysis 
of how application-aware networks can play editorial functions that help manage clutter and 
attention costs). 
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exercise quality control. Modern Internet users can also attest to the 
benefits of having filters to help sift through the avalanche of content 
available on the World Wide Web. 
Congress recognized the key role that editorial discretion plays in 
the transmission of content when it enacted the seminal statutes with 
respect to broadcasting. During consideration of both the Radio Act of 
1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, Congress considered and 
rejected proposals to provide a limited right of nondiscriminatory ac-
cess.170 Instead, Congress went in the other direction by including a 
provision prohibiting the regulation of broadcasters as common carri-
ers.171 In so doing, “Congress specifically dealt with — and firmly 
rejected — the argument that the broadcast facilities should be open 
on a nonselective basis.”172 Exercise of such discretion inevitably 
privileges some communications over others, but as a plurality of the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged: “For better or worse, editing is 
what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of mate-
rial.”173 Since then, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated the 
importance of preserving broadcasters’ editorial discretion.174  
The regulation of cable television followed a similar pattern. In 
accordance with early calls for regulating cable as a common car-
rier,175 the FCC initially embraced turning cable into a common car-
rier with respect to at least some of its channels,176 only to see the 
 
170. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702–05 (1979) (reviewing the leg-
islative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 with respect 
to whether they should be treated as common carriers); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 
412 U.S. 94, 105–10 (1973) (plurality opinion) (same); Lili Levi, The FCC, Indecency, and 
Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 140–48 (1996) (same). 
171. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 3(h), 48 Stat. 1062, 1066 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 153(10)); Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 17, 44 Stat. 1162, 1169–70 
(superseded by the Communications Act of 1934). 
172. See CBS, 412 U.S. at 105 (plurality opinion).  
173. Id. at 124 (plurality opinion).  
174. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1998); FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of Cal., Inc. 468 U.S. 364, 378–80 (1984); CBS, 412 U.S. at 105 
(plurality opinion); id. at 140 n.9 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 151–53 & n.2 (Douglas, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  
175. See, e.g., Memorandum from the General Counsel, Chief of the Common Carrier 
Bureau, Chief Engineer, and Chief of the Broadcast Bureau to the FCC on the Status of So-
Called Community Antenna Television Systems under the Communications Act of 1934 as 
Amended (Mar. 25, 1952), reprinted in Television Inquiry, Part 6: Review of Allocation 
Problems, Special Problems of TV Service to Small Communities: Hearings on S. 376 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong. 3490 (1958); 
CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMC’NS, CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 29–30 (1974); 
RESEARCH AND POLICY COMM. OF THE COMM. ON ECON. DEV., BROADCASTING AND 
CABLE TELEVISION: POLICIES FOR DIVERSITY AND CHANGE 70 (1975); ITHIEL DE SOLA 
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 168 (1983); Bruce M. Owen, Public Policy and Emerg-
ing Technology in the Media, 18 PUB. POL’Y 539, 546, 551 (1970). 
176. See Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning 
the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 
76.251, Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1978); Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of 
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Sys-
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Supreme Court strike down that regulation as inconsistent with the 
policy embodied in the Communications Act of 1934 in favor of pre-
serving editorial control over content.177 In the process, the Court em-
phasized “Congress’ stern disapproval . . . of negation of the editorial 
discretion otherwise enjoyed by broadcasters and cable operators 
alike.”178
In later cases, the Court repeatedly reemphasized the importance 
of protecting cable operators’ editorial discretion.179 Indeed, when 
Congress and the FCC attempted to bar telephone companies from 
entering the cable television industry, courts struck the ban down for 
placing an impermissible burden on the telephone companies’ First 
Amendment rights.180 Congress would later change course and sanc-
tion limiting cable operators’ editorial control over a portion of their 
channel capacity when it required cable companies to provide leased 
access to unaffiliated programmers.181 Leased access effectively 
turned cable operators into common carriers with respect to a portion 
of their networks.182 A majority of the Court recognized that leased 
access represented a substantial intrusion into the cable operators’ 
editorial discretion.183 And as noted earlier, implementation of regula-
tions designed to guarantee access to content has proven quite cum-
bersome.184
The fact that telecommunications networks now serve as the con-
duit for mass communications and not just person-to-person commu-
 
tems; and Inquiry into the Development of Communications Technology and Services to 
Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 427 ¶ 26 (1969). 
177. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699–707 (1979). 
178. Id. at 708. 
179. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994); City of Los Angeles 
v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc. 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 
439, 444 (1991) (“Cable television provides to its subscribers news, information, and enter-
tainment.”). 
180. See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United 
States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); S. New 
England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 1995); BellSouth Corp. v. 
United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 
F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 
779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994). The issue had already been briefed and argued before the 
Supreme Court when it was rendered moot by a provision of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 eliminating the rule. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
§ 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)). 
181. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, Part II, § 611, 98 
Stat. 2779, 2782 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 532). 
182. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 796 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part). 
183. See id. at 761 (opinion of Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ.); id. at 796 
(Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part). 
184. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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nications greatly expands the justification for allowing them to exer-
cise editorial control over the information they convey. In the process, 
it further weakens the case in favor of network neutrality. 
B. Network Diversity and Dynamic Efficiency 
Not only would network neutrality threaten to reduce static effi-
ciency; it also poses a serious risk to dynamic efficiency. I draw on 
the literature exploring the impact of mandating interconnection on 
dynamic efficiency in the context of antitrust,185 UNE access,186 and 
multiple ISP access to cable modem systems187 to show how the re-
gime of mandatory interconnection and standardization can discour-
age entry into the last mile. As a result, network neutrality would 
appear to conflict directly with the goals of dynamic efficiency and 
would instead be the source of, rather than the solution to, market 
failure. Conversely, embracing a network diversity principle promises 
to promote competition in the last mile and thereby alleviate the cen-
tral issue confronting broadband policy. 
The reasons why mandating interconnection is potentially prob-
lematic from the standpoint of dynamic efficiency can best be ex-
plained in terms of the hypothetical example based on Terminal 
Railroad discussed above. Suppose that access to the bridge was not 
compelled and that rates were not regulated. Any supracompetitive 
returns earned by the owner of the existing bridge would signal that 
the market was in disequilibrium and would provide the incentive for 
anyone interested in building another bridge to do so. In addition, the 
railroads that were unable to obtain access to the existing bridge 
would be clamoring for an alternative. They would thus represent the 
natural strategic partners for any would-be builder of another bridge.  
The situation changes dramatically if access to the bridge is com-
pelled. Granting access lets the customers who would otherwise stand 
ready to invest in a new bridge off the hook, rescuing them from hav-
ing to undertake the risks associated with investing in alternative ca-
pacity. At the same time, the would-be bridge entrant would also find 
entry less attractive. Knowing that it would be forced to share the new 
bridge with all comers at regulated prices weakens the incentives for it 
to construct another bridge. Indeed, rate regulation can deprive the 
 
185. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶ 771b, at 174–76, ¶ 773a, at 201; 
Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1190–94, 
1209–12 (2002). 
186. See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the 
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 457–61 
(1999); Robert W. Crandall & Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in U.S. Telecommunications 
Service: Effects of the 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: 
WHAT’S NEXT? 73, 107–10 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000); Thomas M. 
Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000). 
187. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 246–47, 268–69; Lopatka & Page, supra note 28. 
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new entrant of the returns it needs to survive.188 Granting access thus 
threatens to frustrate the appearance of alternative bridge capacity that 
remains the central goal of competition policy in this situation. In so 
doing, it threatens to entrench the existing bridge monopolist into 
place. As the Supreme Court recently noted: 
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing 
an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to 
serve their customers. Compelling such firms to 
share the source of their advantage is in some tension 
with the underlying purpose of antirust law, since it 
may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the ri-
val, or both to invest in those economically benefi-
cial facilities.189
At the same time, the obligation to share the benefits of any improve-
ments also reduces the incumbents’ incentives to undertake the in-
vestments needed to upgrade existing network technologies.190 This 
dynamic is why courts and leading commentators have consistently 
condemned compelling access to communications networks whenever 
competition from alternative network platforms is feasible.191 The 
 
188. The FCC’s experience with a broadcast regulation known as the financial interest 
and syndication rules (“finsyn”) illustrates how imposing rate regulation discourages in-
vestment in alternative networks. Finsyn attempted to curb the dominant positions held by 
ABC, CBS, and NBC by limiting the extent to which networks could take ownership stakes 
in the programming that they televised. Reducing the profitability of networking had the 
inevitable consequence of deterring entry by new networks. This is confirmed by the fact 
that the Fox network was unable to enter successfully until it obtained a waiver from finsyn. 
See Fox Broadcasting Co. Request for Temporary Waiver of Certain Provisions of 47 
C.F.R. § 73.658, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 3211 (1990); Jim Chen, The 
Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 
MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1457 (1996). The courts eventually struck down finsyn as arbitrary 
and capricious. See Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992); Capital 
Cities/ABC v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994). The rules were eliminated shortly thereaf-
ter. See Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Sections 73.659–73.663 of 
the Commission’s Rules, Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,165 (1995). 
189. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407–08 (2004). 
190. See accord AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428–29 (1999) (Breyer, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original 
owner’s incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits 
of the value-creating investment, research, or labor.”). 
191. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388–89 (rejecting the imposition of UNE access 
when the network elements are available from alternative sources); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. 
FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting order requiring unbundling of DSL-
compatible portion of telephone lines due to the order’s failure to take into account competi-
tion from cable modem systems); 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶ 773b2, at 
200–03 (limiting compelled access to essential facilities to situations in which the facility 
cannot be obtained from another source); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2711 (2005) (upholding the FCC’s decision that the avail-
ability of broadband services from other sources justified refusing to impose access re-
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need to stimulate reinvestment also undercuts asymmetric regulatory 
proposals that would impose interconnection mandates only on in-
cumbents with market power.192 Focusing on current market shares 
can be misleading in industries that are undergoing rapid growth, 
since it is future rather than current shares that are important. Even 
more importantly, imposing more stringent regulation on incumbents 
is also problematic in a world in which encouraging reinvestment in 
existing networks is as important as encouraging investment in new 
network technologies.193  
The same dynamics can be illustrated by considering a hypotheti-
cal town in which there is a single department store. Much like a 
broadband network, a department store is simply a conduit for goods 
and services produced by others. Upon reflection, it becomes clear 
that imposing a rule requiring all department stores to make space 
available to all manufacturers on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
basis would discourage entry by a second department store. Although 
entrants often find it profitable to enter into competition with a mo-
nopolist earning monopoly rents, this incentive is reduced if rate regu-
lation precludes any such rents from being earned. In addition, the 
frustrated manufacturers who would otherwise be eager to support 
construction of a second department store would also lose their enthu-
siasm for the project. Furthermore, compelling access to the depart-
ment store shelves would also limit the ability of stores to control 
whether an appropriate mix of goods was represented or to assure that 
the goods satisfied certain quality standards. Preventing consolidation 
with manufacturers can preclude the achievement of real efficiencies 
by using tighter integration through inventory management and elec-
tronic data interchange to reduce costs. Department stores often try to 
promote their popularity by entering into exclusivity arrangements 
with key manufacturers, sometimes even establishing boutiques in 
 
quirements on cable modem systems). See generally Yoo, supra note 33, at 246–47 (review-
ing additional authorities). 
192. See William P. Rogerson, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunication Regu-
lations, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2000) (book review); James B. Speta, Deregulating 
Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1036–40, 1154 
(2004). 
193. I would also reject asymmetric regulation proposals that would impose access re-
quirements on DSL, but not cable modem systems. See Joseph Farrell, Open Access Argu-
ment: Why Confidence is Misplaced, in NET NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD 
BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED? (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May 
eds., forthcoming 2005); William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommuni-
cations, the Principle of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for 
Investment and Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 145; Simon Wilkie, Open Net-
works: The Roles of Regulation and Competition, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Confer-
ence on the Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime (Feb. 9, 2004). 
Such asymmetric regulation violates the principles of technological neutrality and threatens 
to place the government in a position of favoring one broadband technology over another. 
See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 1, at 4802 ¶ 6; Wireline 
Broadband NPRM, supra note 1, at 3023 ¶ 6. 
No. 1] Beyond Network Neutrality 51 
 
                                                                                                                 
portions of their stores. Requiring department stores to provide non-
discriminatory access to all manufacturers would thus prevent them 
from pursuing one of the best entry strategies available to new en-
trants.194 Indeed, this type of strategic partnership between manufac-
turers and retailers appears to have played a critical role in promoting 
the growth of the cable industry.195 This mechanism for promoting 
entry would be frustrated by regulations mandating open access to the 
retail platform. 
This underscores the extent to which mandating access to a bot-
tleneck facility represents surrender to the monopoly. The normal re-
sponse of competition policy when it encounters monopolies is to 
break them up. Mandating interconnection deviates from this tradition 
by addressing the symptoms of monopoly power without treating its 
causes. Instead of breaking up the monopoly, access leaves it in place 
and only requires that it be shared. Furthermore, approaches that 
break up monopolies necessarily have built-in exit strategies embed-
ded within them. Mandated sharing of a bottleneck facility, in con-
trast, implicitly envisions that the monopoly, and thus the regime of 
regulatory oversight, will persist indefinitely.  
Such an approach might be appropriate if entry by a competitor to 
the bottleneck were impossible, as was arguably the case when the 
FCC and the courts relied on interconnection and standardization to 
promote competition in CPE, long distance, and enhanced services.196 
In that event, any reduction of incentives to invest in alternative net-
work capacity would be beside the point, because such entry would be 
impossible. The situation is quite different when entry by alternative 
network capacity is feasible. In that case, the reduction in investment 
incentives may short circuit the natural process by which markets dif-
fuse bottlenecks. In the worst case scenario, mandating interconnec-
tion can itself have the perverse effect of entrenching the existing 
monopolies into place. Indeed, Milton Mueller has shown that during 
the early years of the telephone industry, the absence of an intercom-
nection requirement helped drive the rapid geographical buildout of 
the telephone network, as the Bells and the independent telephone 
companies competed to satisfy customers.197 Subsequent empirical 
studies have confirmed that the provisions mandating access to local 
telephone facilities have dampened investment incentives in precisely 
this manner.198 Other empirical studies indicate that unbundling of 
broadband facilities has had a similar adverse effect.199
 
194. See Shapiro, supra note 107, at 678 (noting how exclusivity can “encourage invest-
ment in . . . networks”). 
195. See OWEN & ROSSTON, supra note 28, at 3. 
196. See supra notes 42–50 and accompanying text. 
197. See MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 3 (1997).  
198. See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its 
Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 
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By now, the implications for broadband policy should be mani-
fest. The central focus in deciding whether to mandate network neu-
trality should be on its effect on stimulating competition in the last 
mile. If subject to mandatory interconnection, standardization, non-
discrimination, and rate regulation, any would-be last-mile entrant 
would realize that even if it were successful, it would be forced to 
make its platform available to all content and application providers 
under rates that would limit it to ordinary returns. In addition, the 
would-be builder would not find a group of content and applications 
providers clamoring for additional access, since mandating intercon-
nection to the existing platform would rescue them from having to 
invest in alternative distribution arrangements. In the process, network 
neutrality risks reducing incentives to invest in new last-mile tech-
nologies to the extent that it cements the existing last-mile oligopoly 
into place. Although such a policy might be justifiable if entry by al-
ternative network capacity were impossible, it is indefensible when 
3G, WiFi, powerline, and other technologies are actively searching for 
capital to support their deployment and when the state of the art in 
transmission is undergoing rapid technological change. At best, the 
inevitable lag in enacting new regulations will cause economic losses. 
At worst, by destroying incentives to build new technologies and to 
reinvest in existing technologies, regulation might itself be the cause, 
rather than the consequence, of market failure. Under these circum-
stances, mandating network neutrality would appear to pose a serious 
threat to dynamic efficiency. 
It is for this reason that the FCC has repeatedly stated that its de-
cisions with respect to broadband will be guided by the principle that 
“broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment 
that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market.”200 
The manner in which lack of interconnection can stimulate investment 
 
(2005); Augustin J. Ros & Karl McDermott, Are Residential Local Exchange Prices Too 
Low?, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A. Crew ed., 
2000); James Zolnierek et al., An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in Local Tele-
phone Markets, 19 J. REG. ECON. 143 (2001); Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling 
Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment? (March 12, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=387421. 
199. See Debra J. Aron & David E. Burnstein, Broadband Adoption in the United States: 
An Empirical Analysis, in DOWN TO THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND 
REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Allan L. Shampine ed., 2003); 
Martha Garcia-Murillo, International Broadband Deployment: The Impact of Unbundling, 
57 COMM. & STRATEGIES 83 (2005); Bronwyn Howell, Infrastructure Regulation and the 
Demand for Broadband Services: Evidence from OECD Countries, 47 COMM. & 
STRATEGIES 33 (2002); Yoo, supra note 144, at 195–96; Jung Hyun Kim et al., Broadband 
Uptake in OECD Countries: Policy Lessons from Comparative Statistics Analysis (unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the 31st Research Conference on Communication, Informa-
tion and Internet Policy, Sept. 20, 2003), available at http://tprc.org/papers/2003/203/Kim-
Bauer-Wildman.pdf. 
200. Wireline Broadband NPRM, supra note 1, at 3022 ¶ 5; accord Cable Modem De-
claratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 1, at 4802 ¶ 5. 
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in new networks is eloquently demonstrated by the fact that major 
complementary services and equipment providers, such as Google, 
EarthLink, IBM, Intel, and Disney, have each undertaken major in-
vestment in alternative broadband technologies in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Brand X decision.201 Embracing network diversity as 
a policy, in contrast, would thus appear to provide substantial incen-
tives to support the build-out of new last-mile facilities.  
C. Noneconomic Justifications for Network Neutrality 
In addition to the economic rationales discussed above, some 
commentators have invoked noneconomic rationales to justify net-
work neutrality.202 Drawing inspiration from the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that “it has long been a basic tenet of national communi-
cations policy that the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the 
public,”203 some of these scholars argue that the central rationale is to 
promote political discourse, even if it might be more economical to 
limit access.204 Indeed, there is a long legacy of regulating network 
industries in order to protect access by small producers that dates back 
to the initial regulation of the railroads in the late 19th Century.205 
Following the landmark Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illi-
nois,206 other scholars justify the imposition of interconnection, stan-
 
201. See Michael Bazeley, Google Offers Free WiFi Net for S.F., SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, at 1; Jesse Drucker & Merissa Marr, Disney to Enter Cellphone Mar-
ket, with Kids in Mind, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2005, at D5; Ed Gubbins, Intel Gets Behind 
BPL, TELEPHONY, Sept. 5, 2005, at 16; Bob Keefe, Battered EarthLink Shifts Gears: Phone 
Services Play Role in Makeover, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 24, 2005, at C1; Ken Ker-
schbaumer, Plug-and-Play Internet: Wall-Outlet Broadband Attracts Heavy Hitters, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 18, 2005, at 20. 
202. See, e.g., Lance Liebman, Foreword: The New Estates, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 
833 (1997) (“Should the populist ancestry of the Sherman Act be revisited to contend with 
telecommunications giants?”). 
203. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663–64 (1994) (quoting United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n. 27 (1972) (plurality opinion)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 
192 (1997). 
204. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of 
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J., 561, 565–
68, 578 (2000); Cooper, supra note 6, at 191–99; cf. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (noting that the purpose of the policy of promoting “the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources” is “to facilitate the public 
discussion and informed deliberation, which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years 
ago, democratic government presupposes”). 
205. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1044–54 (1988); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regula-
tion in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197–208, 1219–20 (1986). 
206. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876); accord Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 532 (1892) 
(“[T]he right of the legislature to regulate the charges for services in connection with the use 
of property did not depend in every case upon the question whether there was a legal mo-
nopoly.”); Roger D. Colton, Heightening the Burden of Proof in Utility Shutoff Cases In-
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dardization, nondiscrimination, and rate regulation requirements be-
cause telecommunications networks are “affected with a public inter-
est.”207
There is noting incoherent about imposing regulation to promote 
values other than economic welfare. The problems with this approach 
are more practical than conceptual.208 Unless protecting the widest 
possible diversity of sources is a virtue in and of itself that trumps all 
other values, such a theory must provide a basis for quantifying the 
noneconomic benefits and for determining when those benefits justify 
the economic costs. Our nation’s experience with antitrust law has 
revealed that telecommunications networks are often subject to 
economies of scale,209 which in turn implies that forcing communica-
tions enterprises to remain small can exact a price. At some point, the 
marginal benefit associated with protecting another small voice will 
fall short of the marginal costs of preventing network firms from real-
izing the available economies of scale.  
The problem is that arguments in favor of protecting small cus-
tomers and speakers have historically failed to reflect any sense of 
optimality and have instead regarded additional diversity as an abso-
lute good.210 But the presence of scale economies underscores the ba-
sic fact that promoting diversity exacts a cost that must be traded off 
against the benefits of additional producers. As the D.C. Circuit has 
noted in a related context, “Everything else being equal, each addi-
tional ‘voice’ may be said to enhance diversity. . . . But at some point, 
surely, the marginal value of such an increment in ‘diversity’ would 
not qualify as an ‘important’ governmental interest. Is moving from 
100 possible combinations to 101 ‘important’?”211 More recent pro-
nouncements have begun to acknowledge that not “each and every 
incremental increase in the number of outlet owners can be justified as 
necessary in the public interest” and that “there certainly are points of 
 
volving Allegations of Fraud, 33 HOW. L.J. 137, 140 n.22 (1990) (noting that in Brass v. 
North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391 (1894), “the Supreme Court held: ‘in the face of 
an able argument by counsel and a strong dissenting opinion based squarely on the theory 
that virtual monopoly is necessary to warrant government regulation under the doctrine of 
the Munn case, that it is the public nature and not the monopolistic character which justifies 
control of a business as a public utility’”). 
207. See Speta, supra note 6, at 261 & n.185, 270–71. 
208. For a more general critique of attempts to build theories of media regulation on de-
mocratic principles, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-
Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 306–46 (2003). 
209. See supra Part III.A.2. 
210. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, First Re-
port and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 311 ¶ 21 (1970) (“A proper objective is the maximum 
diversity of ownership that technology permits in each area. We are of the view that 60 
different licensees are more desirable than 50, and even that 51 are more desirable than 
50.”); Cooper, supra note 6, at 197 (“There is no such thing as ‘enough’ democratic dis-
course.”). 
211. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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diminishing returns in incremental increases in diversity.”212 That 
said, the approach has remained decidedly ad hoc. As a result, those 
who take seriously the admonition that it takes a model to beat a 
model will be decidedly reluctant to embrace such an indeterminate 
approach. The open-endedness of the approach and the lack of a clear 
notion of optimality leave it vulnerable to being redirected towards 
political purposes. 
In this regard, the fate of the “Populist” School of antitrust pro-
vides a useful object lesson.213 This School embraced a noneconomic 
vision of competition policy that protected small players in order to 
promote democratic values associated with Brandeisian pluralism 
even when doing so was economically costly.214 Over time, courts and 
commentators began to recognize that because many industries are 
subject to economies of scale, preserving small producers has a price. 
The problem was that Populism failed to provide a basis for determin-
ing when the costs outweighed the benefits. By the end of the 1980s, 
even those sympathetic to the Populist School were forced to concede 
that the economic approach to antitrust had prevailed.215 In the proc-
ess, antitrust shifted from hostility toward vertical integration in order 
to protect small players for largely noneconomic reasons to a more 
nuanced, explicitly economic approach that recognized that vertical 
 
212. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review — Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Report, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, 
13631 ¶ 31 (2003). 
213. For overviews of the conflict between the Chicago and the Populist Schools that 
manifest distinctly different sympathies, see 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, 
¶ 100b, at 4–6, ¶ 111, at 97–115; Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Founda-
tions of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 227–40 (1995); Alan J. Meese, Farewell 
to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 461, 466–67 (2000). 
214. For a classic statement of this position, see United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 
U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (stating that Congress intended to “promote competition through the 
protection of viable, small, locally owned business” even when “occasional higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets”). For other 
similar statements, see, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–11 
(1972); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152–54 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212–13 
(1959); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941) (holding 
group boycotts illegal and evidence of procompetitive benefits inadmissible). 
215. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Implications of Professor Scherer’s Research for the Fu-
ture of Antitrust, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 256, 258 (1990) (recognizing that “the dominant para-
digm today is that the only goal of the existing antitrust laws is to increase economic 
efficiency”); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1981) (conceding that “[r]egard for efficiency is in the as-
cendancy”); Henry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games 
Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892, 892 (1988) (observing that “[c]lassical microeco-
nomic theory . . . has become the dominant tool for contemporary antitrust analysis”); ac-
cord Jacobs, supra note 213, at 239 (“The victory of a purely economic analysis over . . . the 
Modern Populist School could hardly seem more complete.”). 
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integration can yield substantial economic benefits.216 Broadband pol-
icy could be well served to follow the same path and recognized the 
dangers of an excessive focus on preserving the freedom of consum-
ers and content/applications providers and that permitting a degree of 
vertical integration can represent the better way to promote economic 
welfare. 
Arguments justifying the regulation of telecommunications net-
works because they are “affected with the public interest” are simi-
larly unlikely to prove a satisfactory basis for regulation. This doctrine 
was developed during the Lochner era as a means for reconciling the 
intrusive regulation imposed on public utilities with the Court’s will-
ingness to strike down economic regulation as impermissible interfer-
ence with the freedom of contract. 
The category was notoriously slippery. Specifically Courts re-
jected the notion that exercise of the power of eminent domain217 or 
operation under a state franchise218 was by itself sufficient to render 
an industry “affected with the public interest.” Instead, the inquiry 
was governed by a multifactor balancing test, with no one factor being 
dispositive.219 Criticism mounted that the category was analytically 
empty. Eventually, the Supreme Court rejected the entire framework 
as unworkable in its landmark decision in Nebbia v. New York,220 and 
the concept was thereafter regarded as “discarded.”221
This is not to say that Brandeisian principles could not support a 
coherent theory of regulation. It is only to say that no one has yet ar-
ticulated such a theory with sufficient clarity to be coherent. That said, 
the populist vision rests in uneasy tension with the modern economy. 
Brandeisian populism aspires to the type of small scale economic ac-
tivity typically associated with Jeffersonian democracy.222 It also 
 
216. See Yoo, supra note 33, at 186–202. 
217. See id. at 96–97. In addition, courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that private 
property that was initially obtained via eminent domain and is currently used to serve the 
public is somehow entitled to less dignity under the law. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R., 
195 U.S. 540, 569–70, 573 (1904) (noting that a right of way obtained through condemna-
tion remains private property even when devoted to a public use); United Rys. & Elec. Co. 
v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249 (1930) (holding that “the property of a public utility, although 
devoted to the public service and impressed with a public interest, is still private property”), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 
U.S. 591 (1944); Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(“A property owner is entitled to expect that the property it acquired via eminent domain . . . 
came with the right all property has.”). 
218. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 534 (1934). 
219. See FORD P. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC 
INTEREST 17–55, 90–145 (1940). 
220. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536; accord Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 451 (Stone, J., dissenting).  
221. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941); 
accord RONALD A. ANDERSON, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 225 (4th ed. 1981) (arguing 
that Nebbia “destroyed that concept”). 
222. See Rabin, supra note 205, at 1219–20. In the words of Brandeis himself: 
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tends to value economic stability for its own sake, since instability 
tends to break down the citizenry.223 As such, it does not seem well 
suited to industries like broadband, in which large scale, rapid, and 
often disruptive change are prominent features. 
IV. THE AMBIGUOUS POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK 
DIVERSITY 
It thus appears to be quite possible to make out a plausible case in 
favor of network diversity. Indeed, the economic considerations dis-
cussed above suggest that adopting network neutrality would be a 
mistake and that encouraging network diversity may well cause eco-
nomic welfare to increase. I must acknowledge, however, that the case 
for network diversity is subject to a number of caveats that make the 
determination of whether network diversity would constitute good 
policy quite complex. 
This Part takes a closer look at the complexities of the welfare 
calculus. I begin by debunking the common misperception that en-
dorsing network diversity would be tantamount to embracing the 
Schumpeterian vision of competition. On closer inspection, it be-
comes clear that the two approaches are quite distinct. I then examine 
the welfare implications of network diversity, concluding that whether 
or not network diversity would promote economic welfare is an em-
pirical question that cannot be determined a priori. I then review the 
institutional considerations regarding the likely benefits of administra-
tive intervention. In so doing, I also explore the relative merits of 
 
[S]ize alone gives to giant corporations a social significance not at-
tached ordinarily to smaller units of private enterprise. Through size, 
corporations, once merely an efficient tool employed by individuals 
in the conduct of private business, have become an institution — an 
institution which has brought such concentration of economic power 
that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the 
state. The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a 
small group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in 
size by their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns in 
which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees and 
the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are sub-
jected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few 
men. . . . The changes thereby wrought in the lives of the workers, of 
the owners and of the general public, are so fundamental and far-
reaching as to lead these scholars to compare the evolving “corporate 
system” with the feudal system; and to lead other men of insight and 
experience to assert that this “master institution of civilised life is 
committing it to the rule of a plutocracy.” 
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also 
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(stating that “the concentration of power leads predictably to socialism that is antagonistic to 
our system”). 
223. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 69, at 909 n.66.  
58  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 19 
 
                                                                                                                 
leaving redress of such matters to antitrust law. I close by offering a 
tentative case in favor of the network diversity approach.  
The key insight is that network diversity is not the mirror image 
of network neutrality, as would be the case if network diversity envi-
sioned mandating the use of proprietary or incompatible protocols. 
Instead, network diversity is best implemented through nonregulation. 
As such, it appears to be the most appropriate course of action when 
faced with an economically ambiguous situation and a technologically 
uncertain future. 
A. The Misunderstood Relationship Between Network Diversity and 
Schumpeterian Competition 
The emphasis on permitting network owners to earn short-run 
economic profits is sometimes mistakenly compared to the type of 
competition proposed by Joseph Schumpeter.224 Schumpeter sug-
gested that the classic model of perfect competition, which envisions 
multiple competitors vying for the same consumers, was passé. In the 
modern era, it had been replaced by a model in which firms do not 
compete on the margin, but rather through discovery of the next 
breakthrough innovation that “commands a decisive cost or quality 
advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the 
outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very 
lives.”225 Supracompetitive returns play a key role in this model. It is 
the prospect of sustainable supracompetitive returns that constitutes 
“the baits that lure capital on to untried trails.”226  
Although Schumpeterian competition and network diversity do 
bear a superficial resemblance to one another, close analysis reveals 
that the theories are quite different. The most distinctive feature of 
Schumpeterian competition is that the classic model of horizontal 
competition within the market, in which multiple firms compete di-
rectly with one another by selling similar products, is replaced by a 
winner-take-all, vertical competition for the market, in which the 
market is dominated by a succession of monopolists. The type of 
competition envisioned by the network diversity approach is more 
reminiscent of the type of horizontal competition associated with con-
ventional economic analyses. Producers do derive some limited mar-
ket power from their ability to differentiate their products, but the 
magnitude of this effect falls far short of the type of dominant advan-
tage envisioned by Schumpeter. Indeed, it is the ability to differentiate 
 
224. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 25, 72–73 (2002); Cooper, supra note 6, at 202–05; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 
6, at 960–62; Wu, supra note 6, at 80–82. 
225. SCHUMPETER, supra note 31, at 84. 
226. Id. at 90. 
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networks that prevents the market from devolving into the type of 
winner-take-all regime associated with Schumpeter and natural mo-
nopoly. In this sense, network diversity is quite anti-Schumpeterian.227
The only similarity between these two approaches is that fact that 
both rely on supracompetitive returns to push competition forward. In 
the case of Schumpeterian competition, these supracompetitive re-
turns are long-lived and sustainable. The network diversity model, in 
contrast, envisions these economic profits to be transient and quickly 
dissipated.228 In this sense, the proper analog for the supracompetitive 
returns in the network diversity approach is the role that short-run 
profits play in stimulating entry under the model of perfect competi-
tion (depicted in Figure 2). The primary difference is that entry is 
modeled in the case of perfect competition by an outward shift of the 
supply curve and modeled in the case of monopolistic competition by 
an inward shift of the demand curve.  
 
















                                                                                                                  
227. Network diversity also eliminates the rent dissipation problems that occur when 
many parties undertake up-front, fixed-cost investments but only one can prevail. See Jenni-
fer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849, 853 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig eds., 1989) (reviewing literature on patent races); Aditya Bamzai, Comment, The 
Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Monopoly Regulation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1525 
(2004) (applying rent dissipation to natural monopoly).  
228. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, this shows the inherent flaw in approaches that attempt to 
regulate away supracompetitive returns when entry is possible. In so 
doing, regulators would eliminate the primary impetus for competitive 
entry, which means that the supply curve would never shift.229 Net-
work neutrality thus represents a surrender to the monopoly that is 
unjustified unless entry is truly infeasible. It also depends on having 
confidence that regulatory authorities would do a better job of dissi-
pating rents than would private ordering and that the authorities would 
be able to revise the regime to eliminate mandatory interconnection as 
soon as technological progress makes entry by alternative networks 
feasible.230  
B. The Complexity of the Welfare Analysis 
Acknowledging that products compete on more dimensions than 
simply price greatly complicates the welfare analysis. When products 
compete solely on price, welfare analysis is simply a matter of deter-
mining total surplus. The multidimensionality of competition under 
network diversity depends on certain factual assumptions and inevita-
bly requires a complex tradeoff among a number of different consid-
erations. 
1. The Robustness of Competition 
In order for network diversity to provide the types of benefits de-
scribed in this Article, the level of competition in equilibrium must be 
sufficiently robust to discipline other providers. The Merger Guide-
lines promulgated by the FTC and the Justice Department suggest that 
competition among six similarly sized firms represents the minimum 
necessary to prevent firms from using vertical integration to harm 
competition;231 the criteria applied by the FCC when reviewing recent 
wireless mergers would find no anticompetitive effects so long as 
roughly four, equally sized competitors remained.232 Indeed, recent 
 
229. See supra Part III.B. 
230. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the institutional considerations surrounding network 
diversity). 
231. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in 1992 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines §§ 4.131, 4.213, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992) (indicating that anti-
trust authorities are unlikely to challenge vertical mergers unless the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index (HHI) in the primary market exceeds 1800), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/guidelines/2614.htm. 
232. See Applications of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. and Cingular Wireless Corpora-
tion for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21522, 21568 ¶¶ 106–107 (2004) (applying an HHI threshold of 
2800); Applications of Nextel Communications, Inc. and Sprint Corporation for Consent to 
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 
F.C.C.R. 13,967, 13,995–96 ¶ 63 (2005); Applications of Western Wireless Corporation and 
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merger decisions suggest that the survival of three firms may be suffi-
cient to preserve the benefits of competition.233 Formal models cali-
brated on engineering data suggest that the level of demand may be 
able to support up to three wireline broadband providers to seventy 
percent of U.S. households.234 Measured against any of these stan-
dards, the overall broadband market is sufficiently competitive to pro-
tect against anticompetitive harms.235 Entry by wireless providers 
(which involve lower up-front entry costs) and other broadband tech-
nologies, such as broadband over powerlines (“BPL”), should inten-
sify competition still further.  
This suggests that for most of the country, competition should 
remain sufficiently robust to ameliorate concerns of anticompetitive 
effects. At the same time, the survival of differentiated firms depends 
on the overall demand for network services.236 It is quite possible that 
for at least some portions of the country, the overall demand will re-
main too thin to support multiple broadband providers. Furthermore, 
the need to acquire spectrum rights, municipal licenses and state-
issued certificates of public necessity and convenience, and access to 
rights of way may constitute entry barriers that slow or prevent the 
deployment of alternative transmission platforms. 
 
Alltel Corporation for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 13,053, 13,073 ¶¶ 46–47 (2005). 
233. See William J. Baer et al., Taking Stock: Recent Trends in U.S. Merger Enforce-
ment, ANTITRUST, Spring 2004, at 15, 17 (suggesting that the FTC is unlikely to challenge a 
merger which leave at least four remaining competitors); Simon Baxter & Frances 
Dethmers, Unilateral Effects under the European Merger Regulation: How Big Is the Gap?, 
E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(7), 380–89, 386 (concluding that both the United States and the Euro-
pean Commission will challenge three-to-two mergers and will take a more permissive 
attitude towards four-to-three mergers); Timothy J. Muris, Opening Remarks Before FTC 
Bureau of Economics Roundtable on Understanding Mergers: Strategy and Planning, Im-
plementation, and Outcomes (Dec. 9, 2002) (suggesting that the FTC is unlikely to chal-
lenge a four-to-three merger that yielded substantial efficiencies), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/mergers021209.htm. Mergers that reduced the number 
of competitors from three to two have generally been opposed. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 
246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); Amend-
ment of the Commission’s Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies, First Report and 
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in IB Docket No. 02-34, and First Report 
and Order in IB Docket No. 02-54, 18 F.C.C.R. 10,760, 10,788 ¶ 64 (2003) (discussing 
benefits of a three-firm market and presumption against three-to-two mergers). But see 
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (approving 3-2 
merger); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004) (same), appeal dis-
missed, No. 04-5291, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004). 
234. See Gerald R. Faulhaber & Christian Hogendorn, The Market Structure of Broad-
band Telecommunications, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 305, 321 (2000). 
235. See Yoo, supra note 36, at 52–53 (reporting that as of the end of 2003, the HHI for 
the broadband industry was 1079, or roughly the equivalent of competition among ten firms 
of equal size). 
236. As Adam Smith observed, “[T]he division of labor is limited by the extent of the 
market.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 17 (Modern Library 1937) (1776). 
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In addition, the differentiation of services inherent in the network 
diversity approach can insulate some subscribers from the benefits of 
competition. While many consumers may find the services provided 
by alterative providers to be equally acceptable, some consumers may 
find themselves tied to the services or characteristics provided by a 
particular provider. These consumers’ preferences will prevent them 
from fully benefiting from entry by alternative works providing dif-
ferent services.237 Whether network diversity will provide sufficient 
competition to mitigate the dangers of vertical integration is thus an 
empirical question that cannot be answered a priori. 
2. The Heterogeneity of Demand 
Whether network diversity would enhance or impair economic 
welfare depends on the structure of demand. The network diversity 
model is based on the assumption that customer preferences are het-
erogeneous. Small players survive by targeting different market seg-
ments. The success of this approach presumes that there are different 
product segments to target. To the extent that consumer preferences 
are homogeneous, multiproduct equilibria will not be sustainable and 
will simply waste resources without yielding any welfare benefits. 
The success of the network diversity model thus depends on assump-
tions about the distribution of preferences.238
Monopolistic competition further assumes that consumer prefer-
ences are symmetric with respect to each of the competing group. The 
primary effect of this assumption is to place each work in equal com-
petition with all other products in the group rather than in localized 
competition with a smaller subset of near neighbors. It is quite possi-
ble that this assumption is false. If so, a new entrant will not steal 
business uniformly from all incumbents. Instead, the entrant will dis-
proportionately take sales from some incumbents and not others. In 
addition, it is quite possible that consumer preferences may not be not 
uniformly distributed across all product possibilities. Both of these 
factors may have the effect of creating localized monopolies similar to 
the one enjoyed by a lone gas station along a desert highway even in 
the absence of entry barriers when the overall volume of traffic is not 
sufficient to support a second station.239
The Chamberlinian result thus depends on a number of empirical 
assumptions about the structure of demand. It cannot be determined a 
priori whether the market will reach equilibrium with multiple players 
 
237. See Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. 
ECON. 141, 145–48 (1979). 
238. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 243–46 & n.100. 
239. See id. at 237, 242, 245–46, 278–79. 
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or, if so, whether that equilibrium will be superior to the network neu-
trality equilibrium in terms of economic welfare. 
3. The Multidimensionality of Welfare Under Network Diversity 
Monopolistically competitive markets reach equilibrium where 
the demand curve and the average cost curve are tangent to one an-
other. Because the demand curve is downward sloping, this will nec-
essarily be a point where the average cost curve is downward sloping 
as well. This also implies that equilibrium will occur at a point where 
the average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve.240 This dic-
tates that any sustainable price will necessarily exceed marginal cost 
and thus that some degree of deadweight loss is endemic under mo-
nopolistic competition. The fact that monopolistically competitive 
markets reach equilibrium at volumes that do not minimize average 
cost led Chamberlin to the conclusion about the pervasiveness of 
market failure.241
Later theorists pointed out that such conclusions failed to reflect 
the full dimensions of the welfare calculus under monopolistic compe-
tition. When products are differentiated, they can contribute to welfare 
not only by offering better prices, but also by incorporating attributes 
that better satisfy particular customers’ ideal preferences. The multi-
dimensionality of competition implies that social welfare cannot be 
completely determined through simple price-cost comparisons. It is 
possible, but not definite, that the reduction in welfare associated with 
the deadweight losses might be offset by the increase in welfare made 
possible by greater product diversity.242  
4. The Possibility of Excess Entry 
Since the earliest days of natural monopoly theory, commentators 
have suggested that entry by more than one network provider might 
be excessive.243 The argument is that even if two companies made the 
fixed cost investment needed to enter, only one would survive. The 
result would force society to bear the fixed costs of building two net-
works even though it was clear from the outset that only one set of 
 
240. See William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous 
Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 668 n.14 (2003) (reproducing a well-known and simple mathematical 
proof of this proposition).  
241. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 100, at 104–09. 
242. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 252–53. 
243. See 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132–54 (London, 
John W. Parker 1848) (observing that allowing monopolists to produce and distribute water 
and gas in London would reduce the costs of production by obviating the need for duplica-
tive machinery, works, and pipes). For a more modern statement of the wasteful duplication 
thesis, see 2 KAHN, supra note 137, at 121–23. 
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wires would ever be used. The network diversity approach reveals 
why duplication of fixed costs might yield social benefits. It raises the 
possibility that the higher costs incurred by each producer might be 
offset by the welfare benefits resulting from enabling consumers to 
consume network services that better satisfy their preferences. 
That said, it is not necessarily given that the multiple entry asso-
ciated with network diversity is always welfare enhancing. In some 
cases, the sales generated by a new entrant may consist of incremental 
customers who were not previously being served by one of the in-
cumbents (an effect sometimes called “demand creation”). When a 
new network’s customers are entirely the result of demand creation, 
its entry is certain to be welfare enhancing. In other cases, its sales 
may consist in whole or in part of customers who were previously 
being served by one of the incumbents (an effect sometimes called 
“demand diversion”), in which case the welfare calculus is more com-
plex. Even though the new entrant must incur fixed costs in order to 
enter, those costs are potentially offset by the welfare benefits associ-
ated with stimulating incremental sales and allowing customers who 
were previously served by the incumbent network to access consumer 
services that better fit their preferences. Few such benefits would exist 
if the products are too similar, and it is far more likely that such dupli-
cative entry would be socially wasteful.244
The net impact of entry under network diversity is thus quite 
complex, depending not only on the extent to which the entrant’s 
revenue represents demand creation or demand diversion, but also on 
the magnitude of the welfare gains that result from providing network 
services that better satisfy the customers cannibalized from the in-
cumbent network. Again, this is not a question that can be answered a 
priori. 
5. The Transaction Costs of Network Diversity 
Adoption of network diversity necessarily requires the incurrence 
of some degree of transaction costs. Some would be temporary, such 
as the costs incurred when network owners voluntarily retool their 
networks to accommodate different standards. Other transaction costs 
would be more enduring. For example, if multiple standards were to 
exist, end users and providers of applications and content would have 
to expend significant resources to verify compatibility with respect to 
different networks. It is theoretically possible that the resulting fric-
tion might be so severe that it more than offsets the benefits of shift-
ing to another standard. When that is the case, society would be better 
off if network diversity were not permitted. 
 
244. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 260–64. 
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At the same time, mandating network neutrality would involve 
transaction costs as well. The costs of adopting, disseminating, main-
taining, and updating a standardized interface are considerable.245 Fur-
thermore, imposing and updating any such interface gives rise to an 
inevitable regulatory delay that can be debilitating when the underly-
ing technology is changing rapidly.246 Indeed, the FCC has recognized 
that network neutrality can actually harm consumers by forcing net-
work owners either to delay deployment of new technologies while 
reengineering their networks to comply with interconnection and in-
teroperability requirements or, in the event that they are able to do so 
economically, by forcing them to forego deploying the full increase in 
capability made possible by a particular innovation.247 Resolution of 
the network neutrality debate thus depends on a complete analysis of 
the transaction costs on both sides of the equation. 
6. Long-Run Dynamic Efficiency Gains Versus Short-Run Static 
Efficiency Losses 
Entry by providers of differentiated networks will not be instanta-
neous. Thus, even if monopolistic competition is likely to yield dy-
namic efficiency benefits over the long-run, the inevitable delays in 
entry may force the market to incur short-run static efficiency losses. 
Some scholars have categorically asserted that because the dynamic 
efficiency gains will be compounded over time, they will invariably 
exceed the short-run static efficiency losses.248 This approach seems 
too simplistic. Whether the dynamic efficiency gains will dominate 
the static efficiency losses depends on a myriad of factors, including 
the magnitude of the gains and losses, the speed of entry, and the ap-
propriate discount rate. Determining the welfare implications of net-
work diversity requires a multifaceted inquiry that is not susceptible 
to a simple policy inference. 
C. Institutional Considerations 
In addition to the theoretical economic considerations identified 
above, institutional considerations should also inform the choice be-
tween network diversity and network neutrality. These considerations 
raise doubts as to the advisability of having the FCC impose network 
neutrality. 
 
246. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 13, at 14,890–91 ¶ 71. 
247. See id. at 14,887–90 ¶¶ 65–70. 
248. See WALTER G. BOLTER ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1980’S, at 
360 (1984); Janusz Ordover & William Baumol, Antitrust Policy and High-Technology 
Industries, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Winter 1988, at 13, 32. 
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1. Fact Specificity 
As noted above, the welfare calculus depends on a wide variety of 
contextual factors. The complexity of the welfare calculus renders it 
difficult to determine a priori whether universal adoption of the net-
work diversity principle would promote or harm economic welfare. 
The problem is that regulation tends to take the form of ex ante 
rules,249 and such rules tend to be ill-suited to factually nuanced de-
terminations. Regulation is an inherently blunt instrument that acts in 
a categorical, non-fact-specific manner. It is less well suited to resolv-
ing issues that demand detailed inquiry into the circumstances of indi-
vidual cases.  
Some commentators attempt to avoid the clumsiness of ex ante 
regulation by urging the adoption of a general regulatory standard of 
nondiscriminatory access that leaves the details of the regulatory re-
gime to be developed after the fact through case-by-case adjudication 
on an ex post basis.250 Although better able than ex ante regulation to 
take into account the context-specific considerations I have described 
above, such an approach threatens to stifle network diversity nonethe-
less. Even proponents of network diversity concede that deviations 
from interconnectivity and standardization are sometimes justified and 
that it can be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a par-
ticular deviation is justified.251 When that is the case, the usual policy 
response is to allow experimentation with different business practices 
and to place on those who would oppose such practices the burden to 
demonstrate some adverse effect on competition.  
Erecting a presumption against discriminatory access and forcing 
owners to justify any deviations would have the effect of foreclosing 
practices that are ambiguous or for which evidence of actual market 
performance is lacking. This would have the unfortunate effect of 
preventing the development of network diversity even if entry by di-
versified network providers would be welfare enhancing. Given the 
difficulties in forecasting the impact of technological change and in 
predicting which business models will ultimately prove successful, the 
humility inherent in a more restrained approach provides critical 
breathing room for the experimentation upon which the innovative 
process depends. Although the difference between the network diver-
sity approach and the more modest, ex post versions of network neu-
trality at first glance may appear to be nothing more than a difference 
in emphasis or a shift in the burden of proof, allowing practices to go 
forward until they are proven harmful has the important consequence 
 
249. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text. 
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of permitting experimentation with ambiguous practices that would be 
foreclosed under a presumption of nondiscrimination.  
Even if competition were not sufficiently robust to prevent net-
work owners from undertaking anticompetitive conduct, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the type of blanket approach to 
nondiscrimination favored by network neutrality proponents would 
represent the proper policy response. Should a local telephone com-
pany attempt to protect its core business by blocking its DSL custom-
ers from using VoIP or a cable modem provider attempt to protect its 
core cable television business by prohibiting its cable modem custom-
ers from accessing streaming video, such problems would justify a 
targeted response limited to a particular application, as the FCC man-
dated in Madison River.252 Under no circumstances would such con-
cerns support the kind of blanket restrictions envisioned under the 
strongest versions of network neutrality.  
2. Technological Dynamism 
Regulation poses particularly grave risks in industries that are un-
dergoing rapid technological change. When that is the case, even the 
most conscientious regulator will find it hard to keep up with the pace 
of change. Worse yet, whether imposed as an ex ante rule or as a pre-
sumption against discriminatory access with the specific contours of 
the regulatory requirement developed ex post, network neutrality 
would have the effect of foreclosing practices that are ambiguous or 
about which there is too little information. This is why scholars from 
across the political spectrum have warned of the dangers of regulatory 
lag in industries that are technologically dynamic.253 The task con-
fronting policymakers is especially difficult because they would have 
to intervene at a fairly early stage in the technology’s development to 
make any difference, since governmental intervention after the market 
has settled on the optimal technology would serve little purpose.254  
3. Bureaucratic Considerations 
Agencies have long been criticized as imperfect assimilators of 
the public interest. Regulatory decisions are all too often shaped by 
political goals and public interest pressure in ways that are not always 
 
252. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). 
253. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 286–87 (1982); 2 
KAHN, supra note 137, at 127; John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the 
Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1, 21 (1977); Richard A. Posner, 
Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 636 (1969). 
254. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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consistent with good policy.255 Policymakers may also find it tempt-
ing to undervalue the future benefits associated with the entry of al-
ternative network capacity, which will no doubt seem uncertain and 
contingent, and to overvalue the immediate and concrete benefits of 
providing consumers with more choices in the here and now. Indeed, 
the FCC has allowed short-term considerations to override longer-
term benefits in the past.256 Public choice theory strongly suggests that 
the bias in favor of the former over the latter is no accident. 
Administrative agencies are also often thought to exhibit a ten-
dency to enlarge their jurisdiction even when the proper response 
would be to contract it.257 Consider, for example, the emergence of a 
technological alternative to a network that had previously been a natu-
ral monopoly. The proper policy response would be deregulation of 
the previously regulated industry, since the emergence of competition 
would vitiate the justification for regulation in the first place. An 
agency, however, has the incentive to do precisely the opposite. 
Rather than deregulate the old industry, all too often agencies respond 
by asserting jurisdiction over the new industry and extending the same 
restrictive legacy regulations applied to the old industry to the new 
industry. This is exactly what happened in the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (“ICC”) when the emergence of the trucking industry 
eliminated whatever natural monopoly power was enjoyed by the rail-
road. Rather than deregulating railroads, the ICC extended the regula-
tory regime governing railroads to the new competitor. A similar 
pattern emerged when cable television circumvented the supposed 
scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum that justified intrusive regu-
lation of broadcasting.258
The reaction is understandable. Agency personnel have every rea-
son to be reluctant to eliminate the justification for their continued 
employment. In addition, they no doubt grow to identify with the 
regulatory regimes that they administer and are likely to resent and to 
try to control anything that disrupts them. But the emergence of com-
petition in a previously uncompetitive industry is precisely the type of 
disruption that should be embraced. Giving regulatory authorities 
gatekeeper authority over network architecture necessarily puts net-
work policy in the crosshairs of this tension. 
 
255. See BRUCE M. OWEN & RON BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME (1978); 2 
KAHN, supra note 137, at 325–26. 
256. See Yoo, supra note 208, at 272–75. 
257. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971). 
258. For my critique of the broadcast model of regulation, see Yoo, supra note 208. 
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4. Antitrust as a Possible Alternative 
Antitrust-style principles might have implications for the locus of 
enforcement: might courts enforcing antitrust law represent the proper 
forum for addressing these problems?259 Antitrust is well designed for 
the fact-specific, case-by-case determinations that my analysis sug-
gests is appropriate. Because federal judges have life tenure and be-
cause the courts have general rather than industry-specific 
jurisdiction, courts are also less susceptible to capture and bureau-
cratic empire building than agencies. The Supreme Court also recently 
made clear that interconnection disputes are not immune from anti-
trust scrutiny.260
Despite the confidence that some have voiced in antitrust courts’ 
ability to address issues surrounding the new economy, scholars have 
long been critical of antitrust courts’ ability to administer access to 
bottleneck facilities.261 Others have warned that courts lack the insti-
tutional capability and expertise to make the kind of determinations 
needed to implement the regime of interconnection, nondiscrimina-
tion, rate regulation, and standardization implicit in network neutral-
ity.262
The Supreme Court recently agreed, explicitly acknowledging 
that, given the technical nature and complexity of interconnection 
disputes, “[a]n antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day 
enforcer of these detailed sharing obligations.”263 The Court thus held 
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that the presence of a regulatory access regime supervised by an 
agency essentially eliminates the justification for a judicial imposition 
of an access mandate.264 The inclusion of similar language in Brand 
X265 suggests that the same principles apply to broadband as well.266
V. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
Given the complexity of the welfare analysis and the institutional 
considerations, how should the debate between network diversity and 
network neutrality be resolved? Interestingly, Lessig acknowledges 
some of the arguments that I raise267 and even concedes that the final 
resolution is indeterminate.268 Nonetheless he comes down squarely 
on the side of network neutrality. I review the justifications Lessig 
offers for preferring network neutrality before offering my own con-
clusions. 
First, Lessig suggests that although network management is a real 
problem, congestion problems can be solved by increasing bandwidth 
rather than by giving network owners more control over network 
flows. Although Lessig recognizes that this vision of a world with 
“infinite” bandwidth contradicts the basic economic notion that all 
commodities are inherently scarce, he nonetheless states, “I’m willing 
to believe in the potential of essentially infinite bandwidth. And I am 
happy to imagine the scarcity-centric economist proven wrong.”269
As noted earlier,270 there is no compelling reason to believe that 
bandwidth will necessarily increase faster than demand, especially in 
light of the number of bandwidth-intensive applications waiting in the 
wings and the fact that the number of potential connections goes up 
 
original) (internal quotations omitted); AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (noting that courts are ill suited to imposing and supervising access requirements 
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266. This conclusion is not above question. The Supreme Court has held that for alleg-
edly anticompetitive conduct to fall outside the scope of antitrust enforcement, regulators 
must be exercising active supervision. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633–
34 (1992); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 
(1980). The mere possibility that the FCC might exercise its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to 
regulate broadband is arguably not sufficiently active supervision to shield last-mile provid-
ers from antitrust liability. That said, such a conclusion would seem largely inconsistent 
with the reasoning of Brand X. 
267. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 46–48, 167–75. 
268. See id. at 47 (recognizing that “[w]e don’t know enough yet to know” whether or 
not implementing “a pricing system for allocating bandwidth” would do more harm than 
good); id. at 174 (conceding that his argument “cannot begin to resolve” whether proprie-
tary control of cable modem systems is necessary to stimulate investment in network infra-
structure); id. at 175 (admitting that in determining whether to give network owners power 
over the network, “we have no good way to make sure that the gains outweigh the losses”). 
269. Id. at 47. 
270. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
No. 1] Beyond Network Neutrality 71 
 
                                                                                                                 
exponentially with the number of computers added to the system. Re-
lying on capacity expansion to solve the problems related to conges-
tion is made all the more problematic by the fact that forecasting 
demand is inherently uncertain and capacity cannot be expanded in-
stantaneously. Even when capacity expansion is feasible in the long 
run, any underestimation of projected demand will necessarily create 
short-run scarcity that cannot be addressed through increased band-
width. The inherent uncertainty about future changes in demand ren-
ders it essentially impossible for network owners to rely on the 
expansion of capacity as the sole solution to the problems of network 
management. In addition, adding bandwidth and using network man-
agement techniques that reduce the transparency of the network repre-
sent alternative ways to solve the problems of congestion. Unless one 
assumes that the cost of capacity will necessarily decline faster than 
the growth in the demand for capacity, the relative attractiveness of 
each alternative cannot be determined a priori. Lastly, the nonstan-
dardization and exclusivity inherent in network diversity are often 
designed to improve security or increase functionality wholly apart 
from the desire to reduce congestion. When that is the case, the possi-
bility of adding bandwidth is not responsive to the problem. It would 
thus seem to be a mistake to precommit to one approach over the 
other.  
Second, Lessig also suggests that network neutrality might be jus-
tified by the growing level of concentration in network ownership.271 
Indeed, Lessig is quite skeptical about the prospects that intermodal 
competition from alternative platforms like DSL can provide suffi-
cient discipline for cable modem providers.272 This conclusion rests in 
uneasy tension with Lessig’s faith in unlimited bandwidth as a solu-
tion to the problems of network management.273 Even more impor-
tantly, it is far from clear that concentration represents the threat that 
Lessig suggests once the precise markets that network neutrality is 
designed to protect have been identified.274 The concentration is most 
acute in the market in which last-mile broadband providers bargain 
with end users. As noted earlier, preventing owners of last-mile tech-
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owners: 
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plain why AT&T wouldn’t get it. But this is a point most understand 
without needing to invoke a fancy theory.  
Id. at 176. 
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nologies from entering into exclusivity arrangements and forcing 
them to employ nonproprietary protocols that permit complete inter-
operability would not affect this market one iota. The economic rela-
tionship between last-mile providers and end users is largely 
determined by the fact that most end users currently only have two 
options in terms of last-mile providers: the cable company and the 
telephone company. Mandated network neutrality would not change 
the makeup of this market.275
Imposing network neutrality would have a significant impact on 
the upstream market in which last-mile providers bargain with provid-
ers of applications and content. Major web-based providers, such as 
Amazon.com or eBay, are focused more on the total number of cus-
tomers they are able to reach nationwide than they are on their ability 
to reach customers located in any specific metropolitan area. The fact 
that they may be unable to reach certain customers is of no greater 
concern, however, than the fact that manufacturers of particular 
brands of cars, shoes, or other conventional goods are not always able 
to gain distribution in all parts of the country. Manufacturers who are 
cut off from consumers served by a particular cable or telephone 
company should not face significant problems so long as they are able 
to obtain access to a sufficient number of customers located else-
where.276 The FCC has similarly rejected the notion that the local 
market power enjoyed early cellular telephone providers posed any 
threat to the cellular telephone equipment market, since any one cellu-
lar provider represented a tiny fraction of the national equipment mar-
ket.277 The proper question is thus not whether the broadband 
transport provider wields market power vis-à-vis broadband users in 
any particular city, but rather whether that provider has market power 
in the national market for obtaining broadband content. In short, it is 
national reach, not local reach, that matters.  
When the relevant market is properly defined, it becomes clear 
that this market is too unconcentrated for vertical integration to pose a 
threat to competition. As noted earlier, the concentration levels in the 
broadband industry fall far below the thresholds thought to justify 
anticompetitive concern.278 Indeed, Lessig’s concerns about concen-
tration seem better suited to the network of the past than the network 
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of today. 279 In the context of broadband, they amount to the claim that 
a decision by the largest broadband provider to limit access to its net-
work poses a real threat to competition in applications and content. 
Although such dangers might have been credible in the days in which 
AT&T dominated the last mile, they are considerably less compelling 
during an era in which the largest player controls only twenty-one 
percent of the national market.280 Absent collusion with other provid-
ers, the interconnection decisions of even the largest player are not in 
a position to stifle the competitiveness of the applications and content 
layers. 
Indeed, the ambiguity inherent in the issues surrounding concen-
tration is underscored by comparing Lessig’s concern, which is that 
portions of the network will be too eager to deviate from the estab-
lished standard,281 with the concern associated more frequently with 
network economic effects, which is that users will be too reluctant to 
deviate from the established standard, thereby allowing an obsolete 
technology to become locked in.282 When the latter is the primary 
concern, the presence of large players is a potential boon, rather than a 
bane. Because larger players are able to internalize a greater share of 
the benefits created by their own technology choices, they are logical 
candidates to mitigate the lock-in effects caused by network external-
ities by becoming the sponsor of a new technology.283 In other words, 
to the extent that network economic effects create excess inertia rather 
than excess momentum, attempts to deviate from the existing standard 
should be embraced, rather than rebuffed. 
In the end, Lessig’s primary concern is that network diversity 
would hurt the environment for innovation, which he believes stems 
from the existence of an “innovation commons” in which applications 
and content providers can have access to the entire universe of poten-
tial customers without having to obtain permission from any gate-
keeper. Network owners, Lessig argues, are too eager to fracture the 
interoperability of the Internet because they fail to internalize the 
benefits from innovation associated with network neutrality.284 As 
noted earlier, a close reading of the economic literature reveals that 
the impact of network economic effects on innovation is ambiguous 
and that such concerns appear to be misplaced in the context of a 
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physical network that can be owned and in an industry undergoing 
exponential growth.285 Indeed, the use of the term “commons” creates 
some degree of irony, since the accepted solution to the tragedy of the 
commons is the creation of well-defined property rights,286 which 
would be more consistent with network diversity than network neu-
trality. More recent scholarship on the anticommons has underscored 
the fact that property rights can be too small as well as too large.287 
The presence of innovation externalities more properly suggests the 
existence of an optimal size of a property right rather than a blanket 
presumption in favor of an innovation commons.  
As such, little insight is gained by trying to elevate the preserva-
tion of the innovation commons into a rhetorical trump. The most 
plausible justification resembles a version of the “precautionary prin-
ciple,” which argues that certain harms are so potentially catastrophic 
that regulators should guard against them even when it is uncertain 
whether they will ever come into fruition. Such an argument would 
claim that the potential harm to innovation associated with deviating 
from the transparency that now characterizes the Internet is so great as 
to justify imposing network neutrality prophylactically.288 The prob-
lem with this argument is that the precautionary principle is incoher-
ent as an a priori commitment. Because there are risks in adhering to 
as well as deviating from the status quo, taken to its logical conclu-
sion, it forbids all courses of action, since regulation can impose costs 
and foreclose beneficial outcomes just as surely as nonregulation.289
As a result, theorists have attempted to render the precautionary 
principle coherent by limiting application to circumstances in which 
the adverse consequences are truly catastrophic and in which devia-
tions from the status quo are irreversible.290 Neither precondition 
would appear to be satisfied in the case of network neutrality. As the 
experience in reconfiguring local telephone switches for independent 
long distance providers demonstrates, allowing networks to become 
noninteroperable is unlikely to prove irreversible.291 Furthermore, as 
important as innovation on the Internet is, reduced innovation does 
not constitute the type of catastrophic harm that would justify regula-
tory intervention in the absence of a concrete showing of competitive 
harm. 
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Ultimately, Lessig fails to provide a determinative resolution to 
the question. Likewise, I acknowledge that in the absence of a clearer 
picture of the contextual details, my own resolution is necessarily no 
more definitive. Short of swapping ipse dixit claims about better pol-
icy, how should decisionmakers resolve disputes in the face of uncer-
tainty? 
Fortunately, competition policy offers a potential way out of this 
analytical limbo. It suggests that when policymakers cannot determine 
whether a new institutional form would help or hinder competition, 
the proper response is nonregulation until a practice is shown to effect 
a concrete harm to competition. Forbearance from either forbidding or 
mandating any particular solution leaves room for the experimentation 
upon which markets depend.292
Nonintervention is particularly appropriate where, as here, regula-
tors will struggle to distinguish anticompetitive from procompetitive 
behavior. As network neutrality advocates candidly acknowledge, 
deviations from network neutrality are often the result of benign at-
tempts to meet the increasingly varied demands that end users are 
placing on the network.293  
Many of the other considerations I have raised militate in favor of 
network diversity. As a result, placing the burden of proof on those 
who would regulate represents the proper way for regulators to show 
technological humility and accords with our notions of liberty and the 
classic vision of the proper relationship between the individual and 
the state.294 It also allows decisionmaking about technology adoption 
to be decentralized. Finally, it avoids the risks of locking the existing 
technological boundaries between firms into place in industries un-
dergoing dynamic technological change. In the most extreme case, 
regulation can itself become the source of natural monopoly, in which 
case intervention would have the perverse effect of reinforcing the 
market failure that regulation was designed to redress.  
My intuitions are also informed by the practical problems associ-
ated with mandating interconnection, nondiscrimination, rate regula-
tion, and standardization. Experience with cable leased access and 
UNE access has shown how difficult such regimes are to administer 
when interfaces are complex and the underlying technology is chang-
ing rapidly.295 Viewing the history of FCC regulation through the cau-
tionary lens of public choice theory provides an additional reason to 
disfavor regulatory intervention. As noted earlier, it is quite possible 
that regulators will give preference to the concerns of static efficiency, 
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which have concrete impact in the here and now, over the concerns of 
dynamic efficiency, which involve contingent benefits to parties who 
often have yet to be identified.296 The FCC’s history in this regard is 
not promising. Even James Landis, the leading proponent of exper-
tise-driven public interest regulation and one of the key architects of 
the New Deal, acknowledged that the FCC has been a disaster.297  
This bias has unfortunate implications for the permanence of 
regulatory intervention. Compelled sharing of the existing network by 
mandating interconnection, nondiscrimination, rate regulation, and 
standardization implicitly presumes that regulatory supervision will 
continue indefinitely. In short, it represents a surrender to the monop-
oly that is only justifiable if entry by alternative network capacity is 
impossible. In contrast, solutions that focus on dynamic efficiency 
have embedded within them built-in exit strategies. Once a sufficient 
number of broadband network platforms exist, regulatory intervention 
will no longer be necessary. Fostering entry and then deregulating 
once it has occurred seems to me a better ambition for regulatory pol-
icy than committing to the ongoing supervision of both the price and 
nonprice terms of business relationships that network neutrality im-
plies. 
Ultimately, network diversity does not depend upon a definitive 
resolution of the best substantive outcome. It adopts a humbler stance 
towards policymakers’ ability to determine the competitive impact of 
particular practices and to anticipate technological change. Network 
diversity is not simply the mirror image of network neutrality in that it 
does not call for the imposition of proprietary protocols. Instead, it 
adopts a more modest position that permits the experimentation upon 
which economic progress depends to proceed until the practice’s ac-
tual impact can be determined. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There can be no question that network neutrality holds consider-
able allure. The vision of a world in which every end user can obtain 
access to every available application and piece of information is quite 
compelling. It is thus quite understandable that so many commenta-
tors have endorsed network neutrality as a concept. The economic 
advantages of interoperability are considerable, and I would expect 
interoperability to play a central role in the business plans of the vast 
majority of Internet-based businesses. 
The question that must be asked is not whether network neutrality 
yields benefits, but rather whether the threat posed by a single net-
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work owner deviating from network neutrality is so great that regula-
tors should prohibit it from exploring whether network diversity might 
make more sense. My exploration of the arguments underlying net-
work neutrality provides substantial reason for caution. Standardiza-
tion can reduce welfare both by reducing diversity and by biasing he 
market against certain types of applications. It can have the perverse 
effect of reinforcing the sources of market failure used to justify regu-
latory intervention in the first place. It can further entrench monopoly 
power by dampening incentives to invest in alternative network neu-
trality.  
Instead, my analysis suggests that public policy might be better 
served if policymakers were instead to embrace network diversity. 
Doing so would permit end users to enjoy the benefits of product va-
riety. Network diversity also has the potential to mitigate the supply-
side and demand-side scale economies that concentrate telecommuni-
cations markets and to make it easier for multiple networks to coexist. 
The more restrained approach inherent in network diversity is also 
more consistent with the current understanding of the institutional 
capabilities of courts and agencies. It also accommodates technologi-
cal dynamism and humility by providing maximum room for experi-
mentation and development. This is not to say that policymakers 
should reject network neutrality once and for all. What is called for is 
a sense of balance and optimality that can adjust with the circum-
stances. But in the face of technological uncertainty, the more appro-
priate and humble approach would appear to favor forbearance from 
mandating any particular architecture. 
 
